April 20, 2006
The staff of the Committee on Open Government is authorized to issue advisory opinions. The ensuing staff advisory opinion is based solely upon the information presented in your correspondence.
I have received several letters from you in which you raised questions concerning access to various records.
First, you questioned the extent to which a contract awarded by the New York City Department of Homeless Services to operate and manage a shelter could be redacted.
Without knowledge of the content of document, I cannot offer specific guidance. However, as a general matter, the Freedom of Information Law is based upon a presumption of access. Stated differently, all records of an agency are available, except to the extent that records or portions thereof fall within one or more grounds for denial appearing in §87(2)(a) through (i) of the Law. It is emphasized that the introductory language of §87(2) refers to the authority to withhold "records or portions thereof" that fall within the scope of the exceptions that follow. In my view, the phrase quoted in the preceding sentence evidences a recognition on the part of the Legislature that a single record or report, for example, might include portions that are available under the statute, as well as portions that might justifiably be withheld. That being so, I believe that it also imposes an obligation on an agency to review records sought, in their entirety, to determine which portions, if any, might properly be withheld or deleted prior to disclosing the remainder.
The Court of Appeals, the state’s highest court, expressed its general view of the intent of the Freedom of Information Law in Gould v. New York City Police Department [89 NY2d 267 (1996)], stating that:
"To ensure maximum access to government records, the 'exemptions are to be narrowly construed, with the burden resting on the agency to demonstrate that the requested material indeed qualifies for exemption' (Matter of Hanig v. State of New York Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 79 N.Y.2d 106, 109, 580 N.Y.S.2d 715, 588 N.E.2d 750 see, Public Officers Law § 89[b]). As this Court has stated, '[o]nly where the material requested falls squarely within the ambit of one of these statutory exemptions may disclosure be withheld' (Matter of Fink v. Lefkowitz, 47 N.Y.2d, 567, 571, 419 N.Y.S.2d 467, 393 N.E.2d 463)" (id., 275).
Before a contract is awarded, §87(2)(c) is pertinent, for it permits an agency to deny access to records to the extent that disclosure "would impair present or imminent contract awards or collective bargaining negotiations." The key word in that provision in my opinion is "impair", and the question under that provision involves whether or the extent to which disclosure would "impair" the process by diminishing the ability of the government to reach an optimal agreement on behalf of the taxpayers.
As I understand its application, §87(2)(c) generally encompasses situations in which an agency or a party to negotiations maintains records that have not been made available to others. For example, if an agency seeking bids or proposals has received a number of bids, but the deadline for their submission has not been reached, premature disclosure for the bids to another possible submitter might provide that person or firm with an unfair advantage vis a vis those who already submitted bids. Further, disclosure of the identities of bidders or the number of bidders might enable another potential bidder to tailor his bid in a manner that provides him with an unfair advantage in the bidding process. In such a situation, harm or "impairment" would likely be the result, and the records could justifiably be denied. However, after the deadline for submission of bids or proposals are available after a contract has been awarded, and that, in view of the requirements of the Freedom of Information Law, "the successful bidder had no reasonable expectation of not having its bid open to the public" [Contracting Plumbers Cooperative Restoration Corp. v. Ameruso, 105 Misc. 2d 951, 430 NYS 2d 196, 198 (1980)].
The other exception that might be pertinent, §87(2)(d), permits an agency to withhold records that:
"are trade secrets or are submitted to an agency by a commercial enterprise or derived from information obtained from a commercial enterprise and which if disclosed would cause a substantial injury to the competitive position of the subject enterprise."
The question under §87(2)(d) involves the extent, if any, to which disclosure would "cause substantial injury to the competitive position" of a commercial entity. The concept and parameters of what might constitute a "trade secret" were discussed in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., which was decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1973 (416 (U.S. 470). Central to the issue was a definition of "trade secret" upon which reliance is often based. Specifically, the Court cited the Restatement of Torts, section 757, comment b (1939), which states that:
"[a] trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it. It may be a formula for a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or other device, or a list of customers" (id. at 474, 475).
In its review of the definition, the court stated that "[T]he subject of a trade secret must be secret, and must not be of public knowledge or of a general knowledge in the trade or business" (id.). The phrase "trade secret" is more extensively defined in 104 NY Jur 2d 234 to mean:
"...a formula, process, device or compilation of information used in one's business which confers a competitive advantage over those in similar businesses who do not know it or use it. A trade secret, like any other secret, is something known to only one or a few and kept from the general public, and not susceptible to general knowledge. Six factors are to be considered in determining whether a trade secret exists: (1) the extent to which the information is known outside the business; (2) the extent to which it is known by a business' employees and others involved in the business; (3) the extent of measures taken by a business to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information to a business and to its competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended by a business in developing the information; and (6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others. If there has been a voluntary disclosure by the plaintiff, or if the facts pertaining to the matter are a subject of general knowledge in the trade, then any property right has evaporated."
In my view, the nature of record, the area of commerce in which a commercial entity is involved and the presence of the conditions described above that must be found to characterize records as trade secrets would be the factors used to determine the extent to which disclosure would "cause substantial injury to the competitive position" of a commercial enterprise. Therefore, the proper assertion of §87(2)(d) would be dependent upon the facts and, again, the effect of disclosure upon the competitive position of the entity to which the records relate.
Also relevant to the analysis is a decision rendered by the Court of Appeals, which, for the first time, considered the phrase "substantial competitive injury" in Encore College Bookstores, Inc. v. Auxiliary Service Corporation of the State University of New York at Farmingdale [87 NY2d 410(1995)]. In that decision, the Court reviewed the legislative history of the Freedom of Information Law as it pertains to §87(2)(d), and due to the analogous nature of equivalent exception in the federal Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. §552), it relied in part upon federal judicial precedent.
In its discussion of the issue, the Court stated that:
"FOIL fails to define substantial competitive injury. Nor has this Court previously interpreted the statutory phrase. FOIA, however, contains a similar exemption for 'commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential' (see, 5 USC § 552[b])...
"As established in Worthington Compressors v Costle (662 F2d 45, 51 [DC Cir]), whether 'substantial competitive harm' exists for purposes of FOIA's exemption for commercial information turns on the commercial value of the requested information to competitors and the cost of acquiring it through other means. Because the submitting business can suffer competitive harm only if the desired material has commercial value to its competitors, courts must consider how valuable the information will be to the competing business, as well as the resultant damage to the submitting enterprise" (id., 419 - 420).
In my view, only those portions of a contract may be withheld which if disclosed would cause substantial injury to the competitive position of a commercial enterprise.
Second, you referred to a request for copies of "all prostitution complaints filed within New York County during January, February and March, 2003", except those that have been sealed pursuant to §160.50 of the Criminal Procedure Law. A possible issue involves the extent to which the request "reasonably describes" the records sought as required by §89(3) of the Freedom of Information Law. I point out that it has been held by the Court of Appeals that to deny a request on the ground that it fails to reasonably describe the records, an agency must establish that "the descriptions were insufficient for purposes of locating and identifying the documents sought" [Konigsberg v. Coughlin, 68 NY 2d 245, 249 (1986)].
The Court in Konigsberg found that the agency could not reject the request due to its breadth and also stated that:
"respondents have failed to supply any proof whatsoever as to the nature - or even the existence - of their indexing system: whether the Department's files were indexed in a manner that would enable the identification and location of documents in their possession (cf. National Cable Tel. Assn. v Federal Communications Commn., 479 F2d 183, 192 [Bazelon, J.] [plausible claim of nonidentifiability under Federal Freedom of Information Act, 5 USC section 552 (a) (3), may be presented where agency's indexing system was such that 'the requested documents could not be identified by retracing a path already trodden. It would have required a wholly new enterprise, potentially requiring a search of every file in the possession of the agency'])" (id. at 250).
In my view, whether a request reasonably describes the records sought, as suggested by the Court of Appeals, may be dependent upon the terms of a request, as well as the nature of an agency's filing or record-keeping system. In Konigsberg, it appears that the agency was able to locate the records on the basis of an inmate's name and identification number.
While I am unfamiliar with the recordkeeping systems of the City, to extent that the records sought can be located with reasonable effort, I believe that the request would have met the requirement of reasonably describing the records. On the other hand, if the records are not maintained in a manner that permits their retrieval except by reviewing thousands of records individually in an effort to locate those falling within the scope of the request, to that extent, the request would not in my opinion meet the standard of reasonably describing the records.
From my perspective, the content of those records would be the key factor in determining rights of access. Names of witnesses or others might be withheld on the ground that disclosure would result in "an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" [see §87(2(b)]; if a matter is ongoing, disclosure might interfere with an investigation or judicial proceeding, and portions of records might properly be withheld under §87(2)(e). In short, an agency’s duty to disclose may vary depending, again, on the contents of the records and the effects of disclosure.
I point out that when a record is available in its entirety under the Freedom of Information Law, any person has the right to inspect the record at no charge. However, there are often situations in which some aspects of a record, but not the entire record, may properly be withheld in accordance with the ground for denial appearing in §87(2). In that event, I do not believe that an applicant would have the right to inspect the record. In order to obtain the accessible information, upon payment of the established fee, I believe that the agency would be obliged to disclose those portions of the records after having made appropriate deletions from a copy of the record. While portions of certain records must be disclosed but others may be redacted, an agency could seek payment of the requisite fee for photocopies, which would be made available after the deletion of certain details (see Van Ness v. Center for Animal Care and Control and the New York City Department of Health, Supreme Court, New York County, January 28, 1999).
Next, you asked whether you may gain access to "mental health evaluations" in possession of the Division of Parole. In this regard, although the Freedom of Information Law provides broad rights of access, the first ground for denial, §87(2)(a), pertains to records that are "specifically exempted from disclosure by state or federal statute." One such statute is §33.13 of the Mental Hygiene Law, which generally requires that clinical records pertaining to persons receiving treatment in a mental hygiene facility be kept confidential.
I note that §33.16 of the Mental Hygiene Law pertains specifically to access to mental health records by the subjects of the records. Under that statute, a patient may direct a request for inspection or copies of his or her mental health records to the "facility", as that term is defined in the Mental Hygiene Law, which maintains the records. It is my understanding that mental health "satellite units" that operate within state correctional facilities are such "facilities" and are operated by the New York State Office of Mental Health. Further, I have been advised that requests for records of such "satellite units" by individuals pertaining to themselves may be directed to the Director of Sentenced Services, Bureau of Forensic Services, Office of Mental Health, 44 Holland Avenue, Albany, NY 12229. It is also noted that under §33.16, there are certain limitations on rights of access.
Next, you asked whether rap sheets disclosed during a public judicial proceeding are accessible. Although the courts are not subject to the Freedom of Information Law, records maintained by state courts are generally available pursuant to other statutes (see e.g., Judiciary Law, §255). I am unfamiliar, however, with statutes concerning public access to federal court records.
Lastly, you questioned your right to obtain your rap sheet "where there is a ‘non-disclosure agreement’." It is my understanding that a rap sheet must be made available by the Division of Criminal Justice Services to the subject of such record upon presentation of the required proof of identity.
I hope that I have been of assistance.
Robert J. Freeman