April 16, 2007
FROM: Robert J. Freeman, Executive Director
The staff of the Committee on Open Government is authorized to issue advisory opinions. The ensuing staff advisory opinion is based solely upon the facts presented in your correspondence.
I have received your letter and hope that you will accept my apologies for the delay in response.
You indicated that you are a member of the Katonah-Lewisboro Board of Education and that the Westchester County Department of Civil Service last year ordered a “a study investigating the ‘senior typist’ civil service positions to confirm that these individuals’ job responsibilities matched the Civil Service titles.” The Department issued two reports indicating its findings, and a resident asked the President of the Board at a Board meeting when the District would receive the report. The President responded, stating that “we are discussing this in executive session and I can’t say anything because of that.” When the resident pressed the issue and asked: “Have we received a report?”, the President reiterated that “this is an executive session, we cannot speak of it and these are personnel matters...”
You expressed an understanding that reports in the nature of those issued are confidential, but that you “don’t understand how it is breaking confidentiality by telling the public that Westchester County Civil Service completed their investigation and issued a report on the subject.”
In consideration of the foregoing, you have sought an advisory opinion involving the following:
“1) Is it breaking confidentiality to tell the public that the Westchester County Civil Service department’s study/investigation has been concluded and that two reports were provided to the Superintendent and Board of Education members,
2) Is the Civil Service report a FOIL’able document?”
From my perspective, the statements offered by the Board President, as well as your understanding of confidentiality, are erroneous and based on misconceptions. In this regard, I offer the following comments.
Misconception # 1 - Confidentiality
Many judicial decisions have focused on access to and the ability to disclose records, and this office has considered the New York Freedom of Information Law, the federal Freedom of Information Act, and the Open Meetings Law in analyses of what may be “confidential.” To be confidential under the Freedom of Information Law, I believe that records must be “specifically exempted from disclosure by state or federal statute” in accordance with §87(2)(a). Similarly, §108(3) of the Open Meetings Law refers to matters made confidential by state or federal law as “exempt” from the provisions of that statute.
Both the state’s highest court, the Court of Appeals, and federal courts in construing access statutes have determined that the characterization of records as “confidential” or “exempted from disclosure by statute” must be based on statutory language that specifically confers or requires confidentiality. As stated by the Court of Appeals:
“Although we have never held that a State statute must expressly state it is intended to establish a FOIL exemption, we have required a showing of clear legislative intent to establish and preserve that confidentiality which one resisting disclosure claims as protection” [Capital Newspapers v. Burns, 67 NY2d 562, 567 (1986)].
In like manner, in construing the equivalent exception to rights of access in the federal Act, it has been found that:
“Exemption 3 excludes from its coverage only matters that are:
specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld.
“5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1982) (emphasis added). Records sought to be withheld under authority of another statute thus escape the release requirements of FOIA if – and only if – that statute meets the requirements of Exemption 3, including the threshold requirement that it specifically exempt matters from disclosure. The Supreme Court has equated ‘specifically’ with ‘explicitly.’ Baldridge v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. 345, 355, 102 S. Ct. 1103, 1109, 71 L.Ed.2d 199 (1982). ‘[O]nly explicitly non-disclosure statutes that evidence a congressional determination that certain materials ought to be kept in confidence will be sufficient to qualify under the exemption.’ Irons & Sears v. Dann, 606 F.2d 1215, 1220 (D.C.Cir.1979) (emphasis added). In other words, a statute that is claimed to qualify as an Exemption 3 withholding statute must, on its face, exempt matters from disclosure”[Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press v. U.S. Department of Justice, 816 F.2d 730, 735 (1987); modified on other grounds,831 F.2d 1184 (1987); reversed on other grounds, 489 U.S. 789 (1989); see also British Airports Authority v. C.A.B., D.C.D.C.1982, 531 F.Supp. 408; Inglesias v. Central Intelligence Agency, D.C.D.C.1981, 525 F.Supp, 547; Hunt v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, D.C.D.C.1979, 484 F.Supp. 47; Florida Medical Ass’n, Inc. v. Department of Health, Ed. & Welfare, D.C.Fla.1979, 479 F.Supp. 1291].
In short, to be “confidential” or “exempted from disclosure by statute”, both state and federal courts have determined that a statute must leave no discretion to an agency: it must withhold such records.
In contrast, when records are not exempted from disclosure by a separate statute, both the Freedom of Information Law and its federal counterpart are permissive. Although an agency may withhold records in accordance with the grounds for denial appearing in §87(2), the Court of Appeals held that the agency is not obliged to do so and may choose to disclose, stating that:
“...while an agency is permitted to restrict access to those records falling within the statutory exemptions, the language of the exemption provision contains permissible rather than mandatory language, and it is within the agency’s discretion to disclose such records...if it so chooses” (Capital Newspapers, supra, 567).
The only situations in which an agency cannot disclose would involve those instances in which a statute other than the Freedom of Information Law prohibits disclosure. The same is so under the federal Act. While a federal agency may withhold records in accordance with the grounds for denial, it has discretionary authority to disclose. Stated differently, there is nothing inherently confidential about records that an agency may choose to withhold or disclose; only when an agency has no discretion and must deny access would records be confidential or “specifically exempted from disclosure by statute” in accordance with §87(2)(a).
The same analysis is applicable in the context of the Open Meetings Law. While that statute authorizes public bodies to conduct executive sessions in circumstances described in paragraphs (a) through (h) of §105(1), again, there is no requirement that an executive session be held even though a public body has the right to do so. The introductory language of §105(1), which prescribes a procedure that must be accomplished before an executive session may be held, clearly indicates that a public body "may" conduct an executive session only after having completed that procedure. If, for example, a motion is made to conduct an executive session for a valid reason, and the motion is not carried, the public body could either discuss the issue in public or table the matter for discussion in the future.
Since a public body may choose to conduct an executive session or discuss an issue in public, information expressed during an executive session is not “confidential.” To be confidential, again, a statute must prohibit disclosure and leave no discretion to an agency or official regarding the ability to disclose.
By means of example, if a discussion by a board of education concerns a record pertaining to a particular student (i.e., in the case of consideration of disciplinary action, an educational program, an award, etc.), the discussion would have to occur in private and the record would have to be withheld insofar as public discussion or disclosure would identify the student. As you are likely aware, the federal Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, “FERPA” generally prohibits an educational agency from disclosing education records or information derived from those records that are identifiable to a student, unless the parents of the student consent to disclosure. In the context of the Open Meetings Law, a discussion concerning a student would constitute a matter made confidential by federal law and would be exempted from the coverage of that statute [see Open Meetings Law, §108(3)]. In the context of the Freedom of Information Law, an education record would be specifically exempted from disclosure by statute in accordance with §87(2)(a). In both contexts, I believe that a board of education, its members and school district employees would be prohibited from disclosing, because a statute requires confidentiality.
As a general matter, the Freedom of Information Law is based upon a presumption of access. Stated differently, all records of an agency are available, except to the extent that records or portions thereof fall within one or more grounds for denial appearing in §87(2)(a) through (j) of the Law.
In the context of the situation that you described, neither the reports prepared by the County Department of Civil Service nor their consideration or discussion by the Board of Education would be “confidential”, for there is no statute specifying that the records must be withheld or that a discussion relating to them must be held in private. It is possible that portions of the report may be withheld under the Freedom of Information Law, or that certain elements of the Board’s discussions may be discussed in executive session. However, there is no obligation to withhold those reports or to conduct an executive session to discuss their contents.
Misconception # 2 - - Personnel
It is emphasized that there is no exception for “personnel matters” in the Freedom of Information Law, and the term “personnel” appears nowhere in that statute. The nature and content of so-called personnel records may differ from one agency to another, and from one employee to another. In any case, neither the characterization of documents as "personnel records" nor their placement in personnel files would necessarily render those documents "confidential" or deniable under the Freedom of Information Law (see Steinmetz v. Board of Education, East Moriches, Sup. Ct., Suffolk Cty., NYLJ, Oct. 30, 1980). On the contrary, the contents of those documents serve as the relevant factors in determining the extent to which they are available or deniable under the Freedom of Information Law.
In considering the kinds of records to which you alluded, I believe that two of the grounds for denial are pertinent. Section 87(2)(b) permits an agency to deny access to records insofar as disclosure would constitute “an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”
Based on judicial decisions, it is clear that public officers and employees enjoy a lesser degree of privacy than others, for it has been found in various contexts that those individuals are required to be more accountable than others. The courts have found that, as a general rule, records that are relevant to the performance of the official duties of a public officer or employee are available, for disclosure in such instances would result in a permissible rather than an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [see e.g., Farrell v. Village Board of Trustees, 372 NYS 2d 905 (1975); Gannett Co. v. County of Monroe, 59 AD 2d 309 (1977), aff'd 45 NY 2d 954 (1978); Sinicropi v. County of Nassau, 76 AD 2d 838 (1980); Geneva Printing Co. and Donald C. Hadley v. Village of Lyons, Sup. Ct., Wayne Cty., March 25, 1981; Montes v. State, 406 NYS 2d 664 (Court of Claims, 1978); Powhida v. City of Albany, 147 AD 2d 236 (1989); Scaccia v. NYS Division of State Police, 530 NYS 2d 309, 138 AD 2d 50 (1988); Steinmetz v. Board of Education, East Moriches, Sup. Ct., Suffolk Cty., NYLJ, Oct. 30, 1980); Capital Newspapers v. Burns, 67 NY 2d 562 (1986)]. Conversely, to the extent that items relating to public officers or employees are irrelevant to the performance of their official duties, it has been found that disclosure would indeed constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [see e.g., Matter of Wool, Sup. Ct., Nassau Cty., NYLJ, Nov. 22, 1977, dealing with membership in a union; Minerva v. Village of Valley Stream, Sup. Ct., Nassau Cty., May 20, 1981, involving the back of a check payable to a municipal attorney that could indicate how that person spends his/her money; Selig v. Sielaff, 200 AD 2d 298 (1994), concerning disclosure of social security numbers].
A possible issue in relation to the matter described involves whether incumbents of certain positions were qualified to hold their positions. In this regard, judicial precedent indicates that several aspects of a resume or application for employment are accessible, including those portions pertaining to a person’s qualifications for a position.
Specifically, it has been held by the Appellate Division that disclosure of a public employee's general educational background would not constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy and must be disclosed [see Ruberti, Girvin & Ferlazzo v. NYS Division of State Police, 641 NYS 2d 411, 218 AD 2d 494 (1996)].
Additionally, in the lower court decision rendered in Kwasnik v. City of New York, (Supreme Court, New York County, September 26, 1997), the court cited and relied upon an opinion rendered by this office and held that those portions of applications or resumes, including information detailing one's prior public employment, must be disclosed. The Court quoted from the Committee's opinion, which stated that:
“If, for example, an individual must have certain types of experience, educational accomplishments or certifications as a condition precedent to serving in [a] particular position, those aspects of a resume or application would in my view be relevant to the performance of the official duties of not only the individual to whom the record pertains, but also the appointing agency or officers ... to the extent that records sought contain information pertaining to the requirements that must have been met to hold the position, they should be disclosed, for I believe that disclosure of those aspects of documents would result in a permissible rather than an unwarranted invasion [of] personal privacy. Disclosure represents the only means by which the public can be aware of whether the incumbent of the position has met the requisite criteria for serving in that position.
Quoting from the opinion, the court also concurred with the following:
"Although some aspects of one’s employment history may be withheld, the fact of a person’s public employment is a matter of public record, for records identifying public employees, their titles and salaries must be prepared and made available under the Freedom of Information Law [see §87(3)(b)].”
Items within an application for employment or a resume that may be withheld in my view would include social security numbers, marital status, home addresses, hobbies, and other details of one’s life that are unrelated to the position for which he or she was hired.
In affirming the decision of the Supreme Court, the Appellate Division found that:
“This result is supported by opinions of the Committee on Open Government, to which courts should defer (see, Miracle Mile Assocs. v. Yudelson, 68 AD2d 176, 181, lv denied 48 NY2d 706), favoring disclosure of public employees’ resumes if only because public employment is, by dint of FOIL itself, a matter of public record (FOIL-AO-4010; FOIL-AO-7065; Public Officers Law §87[b]). The dates of attendance at academic institutions should also be subject to disclosure, at least where, as here, the employee did not meet the licensing requirement for employment when hired and therefore had to have worked a minimum number of years in the field in order to have qualified for the job. In such circumstances, the agency’s need for the information would be great and the personal hardship of disclosure small (see, Public Officers Law §89[b][iv])” [262 AD2d 171, 691 NYS 2d 525, 526 (1999)].
In short, again, the characterization of documents as personnel records is meaningless. Rather, according to judicial decisions, the details within those records that are irrelevant to the performance of one’s duties may generally be withheld. However, those portions of such records detailing one’s prior public employment and other items that are matters of public record, general educational background, licenses and certifications, and items that indicate that an individual has met the requisite criteria to serve in the position, must be disclosed.
Also of possible significance may be an “eligible list” that identifies those who passed a civil service examination. Section 71.3 of the regulations promulgated by the State Department of Civil Service, which is entitled "Publication of eligible lists", states in relevant part that:
"Eligible lists may be published with the standing of the persons named in them, but under no circumstances shall the names of persons who failed examinations be published nor shall their examination papers be exhibited or any information given about them..."
Based upon the foregoing, an eligible list identifies those who passed an exam and, therefore, are "eligible" for placement in a position, and such list is clearly public.
With respect to the report prepared by the County Civil Service Department, most pertinent is §87(2)(g) concerning “inter-agency or intra-agency materials.” While that provision potentially permits a denial of access to those materials, due to its structure it may require that portions be disclosed. The cited provision authorizes an agency, such as a school district or a county, to withhold records that:
"are inter-agency or intra-agency materials which are not:
i. statistical or factual tabulations or data;
ii. instructions to staff that affect the public;
iii. final agency policy or determinations; or
iv. external audits, including but not limited to audits performed by the comptroller and the federal government..."
It is noted that the language quoted above contains what in effect is a double negative. While inter-agency or intra-agency materials may be withheld, portions of such materials consisting of statistical or factual information, instructions to staff that affect the public, final agency policy or determinations or external audits must be made available, unless a different ground for denial could appropriately be asserted. Concurrently, those portions of inter-agency or intra-agency materials that are reflective of opinion, advice, recommendation and the like could in my view be withheld.
Insofar as a report consists of opinions or recommendations, I believe that it may be withheld. However, to the extent that it consists of factual information or is reflective of a final determination or statement of policy, it must be disclosed pursuant, respectively to subparagraphs (i) and (iii) of §87(2)(g). If, for example, the report contains a determination that certain employees hold “improper titles”, I believe that the determination would be accessible to the public. Even though it may name certain employees, a disclosure of that nature would be relevant to the duties of those employees and, therefore, would, in my view, result in a permissible invasion of privacy.
Similarly, although it is used frequently, the term "personnel" appears nowhere in the Open Meetings Law. It is true that one of the grounds for entry into executive session often relates to personnel matters. From my perspective, however, the term is overused and is frequently cited in a manner that is misleading or causes unnecessary confusion. To be sure, some issues involving "personnel" may be properly considered in an executive session; others, in my view, cannot. Further, certain matters that have nothing to do with personnel may be discussed in private under the provision that is ordinarily cited to discuss personnel.
The language of the so-called "personnel" exception, §105(1)(f) of the Open Meetings Law, is limited and precise. In terms of legislative history, as originally enacted, the provision in question permitted a public body to enter into an executive session to discuss:
"...the medical, financial, credit or employment history of any person or corporation, or matters leading to the appointment, employment, promotion, demotion, discipline, suspension, dismissal or removal of any person or corporation..."
Under the language quoted above, public bodies often convened executive sessions to discuss matters that dealt with "personnel" generally, tangentially, or in relation to policy concerns. However, the Committee consistently advised that the provision was intended largely to protect privacy and not to shield matters of policy under the guise of privacy.
To attempt to clarify the Law, the Committee recommended a series of amendments to the Open Meetings Law, several of which became effective on October 1, 1979. The recommendation made by the Committee regarding §105(1)(f) was enacted and states that a public body may enter into an executive session to discuss:
"...the medical, financial, credit or employment history of a particular person or corporation, or matters leading to the appointment, employment, promotion, demotion, discipline, suspension, dismissal or removal of a particular person or corporation..." (emphasis added).
Due to the insertion of the term "particular" in §105(1)(f), I believe that a discussion of "personnel" may be considered in an executive session only when the subject involves a particular person or persons, and only when at least one of the topics listed in §105(1)(f) is considered.
When a discussion concerns matters of policy, such as the manner in which public money will be expended or allocated, the functions of a department or perhaps the functions, creation or elimination of positions, I do not believe that §105(1)(f) could be asserted, even though the discussion may relate to "personnel". In short, in order to enter into an executive session pursuant to §105(1)(f), I believe that the discussion must focus on a particular person (or persons) in relation to a topic listed in that provision. As stated judicially, "it would seem that under the statute matters related to personnel generally or to personnel policy should be discussed in public for such matters do not deal with any particular person" (Doolittle v. Board of Education, Supreme Court, Chemung County, October 20, 1981).
In sum, while there may be instances in which portions of personnel records may be withheld or in which discussions focusing on “particular persons” may be discussed in executive session, there are many others in which those records must be disclosed and in which discussions relating to personnel matters must be discussed in public. To characterize those records or issues as “confidential” in blanket fashion is, in my opinion, contrary to law.
I hope that I have been of assistance.
cc: Board of Education