May 31, 1995
Mr. Wallace S. Nolen
          94-A-6723
          Elmira Correctional Facility
          P.O. Box 500
          Elmira, NY 14902-0500
The staff of the Committee on Open Government is authorized to issue advisory opinions. The ensuing staff advisory opinion is based solely upon the information presented in your correspondence.
Dear Mr. Nolen:
I have received your letter of May 1 in which you raised three questions concerning the Freedom of Information Law.
The first concerns
          rights of access to "the records of the
          civil department of a sheriff, to wit, property executions; income
          executions; payment information of receipts for fees,
          disbursements, levy monies, etc...as authorized...under Article 52
          of the N.Y.S.C.P.L.R." Article 52 of the CPLR pertains to the
          enforcement of money judgments. As a general matter, the Freedom
          of Information Law is based upon a presumption of access. Stated
          differently, all records of an agency are available, except to the
          extent that records or portions thereof fall within one or more
          grounds for denial appearing in §87(2)(a) through (i) of the Law. 
          From my perspective, the kinds of records that you described should
          be disclosed, unless they are sought for commercial or fund-raising
          purposes. In Matter of Nicholas [458 NYS 2d 858 (1983)], a request
          was made to a sheriff for records of income executions for a
          certain period, and it was assumed that the request was made for a
          commercial purpose. That being so, the denial of the request was
          upheld in conjunction with §89(2)(b) of the Freedom of Information
          Law. As you may be aware, that provision includes examples of
          unwarranted invasions of personal privacy, one of which pertains to
          the sale or release of a list of names and addresses if the list
          would be used for commercial or fund-raising purposes
          [§89(2)(b)(iii)]. Based on the foregoing, I believe that an agency
          could condition disclosure upon the receipt of a certification or
          affidavit by an applicant indicating that the records would not be
          used for commercial or fund-raising purposes.
In the second area of inquiry, you wrote as follows:
 "...assuming some and/or all of such
  information is available under F.O.I.L. could
  such sheriff be required to supply such
  information in electronic format and if some
  of the information must be deleted from
  disclosure, must an agency insist on paper
  format which may result in paper exceeding
  10,000 sheets, but conversely, if the agency
  could write a simple computer program in say 1
  hour and 'run in' in 5 minutes to 'delete'
  exempt materials versus over 500 man hours of
  personnel to 'delete' exempt material, which
  method is mandated."
In this regard, the Freedom of Information Law pertains
    to
    existing records, and §89(3) of the Law states in part that an
    agency need not create a record in response to a request. It is
    emphasized, however, that §86(4) of the Freedom of Information
            Law
      defines the term "record" expansively to include:
"any
          information kept, held, filed, produced,
          reproduced by, with or for an agency or the
          state legislature, in any physical form
          whatsoever including, but not limited to,
          reports, statements, examinations, memoranda,
          opinions, folders, files, books, manuals,
          pamphlets, forms, papers, designs, drawings,
          maps, photos, letters, microfilms, computer
          tapes or discs, rules, regulations or codes."
Based upon the language
          quoted above, if information is maintained
          in some physical form, it would in my opinion constitute a "record"
          subject to rights of access conferred by the Law. Further, the
          definition of "record" includes specific reference to computer
          tapes and discs, and it was held some fifteen years ago that"[i]nformation
          is increasingly being stored in computers and access to such data should
          not be restricted merely because it is not in
printed form" [Babigian v. Evans, 427 NYS 2d 688, 691 (1980);
          aff'd
          97 AD 2d 992 (1983); see also, Szikszay v. Buelow, 436 NYS 2d 558
          (1981)]. 
 When information is maintained electronically, it has been
          advised that if the information sought is available under the
          Freedom of Information Law and may be retrieved by means of
          existing computer programs, an agency is required to disclose the
          information. In that kind of situation, the agency in my view
          would merely be retrieving data that it has the capacity to
          retrieve. Disclosure may be accomplished either by printing out
          the data on paper or perhaps by duplicating the data on another
          storage mechanism, such as a computer tape or disk. On the other
          hand, if information sought can be retrieved from a computer or
          other storage medium only by means of new programming or the
          alteration of existing programs, those steps would, in my opinion,
          be the equivalent of creating a new record. As stated earlier,
          since §89(3) does not require an agency to create a record, I
          do
          not believe that an agency would be required to reprogram or
          develop new programs to retrieve information that would otherwise
          be available [see Guerrier v. Hernandez-Cuebas, 165 AD 2d 218
      (1991)].
If the information that you seek cannot be retrieved or extracted without significant reprogramming, an agency would not, in my opinion, be obliged to develop new programs or modify its existing programs in an effort to generate the data of your interest.
 However, often information stored electronically can be
          extracted by means of a few keystrokes on a keyboard. While some
          have contended that those kinds of minimal steps involve
          programming or reprogramming, I believe that so narrow a
          construction would tend to defeat the purposes of the Freedom of
          Information Law, particularly as information is increasingly being
          stored electronically. In my view, if electronic information can
          be extracted or generated with reasonable effort, if that effort
          involves less time and cost to the agency than engaging in manual
          deletions, it would seem that an agency should follow the more
          reasonable and less costly and labor intensive course of action. 
          Whether a court in such circumstances would require an agency to 
      follow that course of action is conjectural.
 Lastly, you wrote that "information contained on income
          executions and property executions become part of a court/county
          clerk file when completion is made (when the sheriff makes his
          'return of service'" and asked whether "the release of the
          information change[s] if the judgment/enforcement of the particular
          papers is not fully completed/paid in full." I am not sufficiently
          familiar with the process to offer an unequivocal response. 
          However, as indicated earlier, the Freedom of Information Law is
          based on a presumption of access. Further, in general, I believe
          that the kinds of records at issue became public when they come
      into the possession of a court clerk or a county clerk.
I hope that I have been of some assistance.
Sincerely,
Robert J. Freeman
  Executive Director
RJF:jm
 State of New York
State of New York