June 7, 1995
Mr. Stephen Grant
P.O. Box 311
Gowanda, NY 14070-0311
The staff of the Committee on Open Government is authorized to issue advisory opinions. The ensuing staff advisory opinion is based solely upon the information presented in your correspondence.
Dear Mr. Grant:
I have received your letter of March 20, which, for reasons
unknown, did not reach this office until May 16. You referred to
your attempts to obtain records from a variety of entities under
the Freedom of Information Law.
In this regard, it is noted at the outset that the Freedom of Information Law pertains to agency records. Section 86(3) of that statute defines the term "agency" to mean:
"any state or municipal department, board,
bureau, division, commission, committee,
public authority, public corporation, council, office or other governmental entity performing
a governmental or proprietary function for the state or any one or more municipalities
thereof, except the judiciary or the state legislature."
As such, the Freedom of Information Law generally applies to
records maintained by state and local government; it would not
apply to a private hospital, a private ambulance service or a
newspaper, for example. Consequently, my comments will be restricted to situations in the which the Freedom of Information Law does or may apply.
Requests made under the Freedom of Information Law should be
directed to the "records access officers" at the agencies
believe maintain records of your interest. The records access
officer has the duty of coordinating an agency's response to
requests. Further, when making a request, §89(3) of the Freedom
Information Law requires that an applicant "reasonably describe"
the records sought. Therefore, a request should contain sufficient
detail to enable agency staff to locate the record.
You mentioned records of an assigned counsel program, and I
assume that you are referring to assignments under "Article 18-B",
which encompasses §§722 to 722-f of the County Law. Under §722,
the governing body of a county and the City Council in New York
City are required to adopt plans for providing counsel to persons "who are financially unable to obtain counsel." Those
involve providing representation by a public defender, by a legal
aid organization, through a bar association, or by means of a combination of the foregoing.
While I believe that the records of the governmental entity
required to adopt a plan under Article 18-B are subject to the
Freedom of Information Law, the records of an individual attorney
performing services under Article 18-B may or may not be subject to the Freedom of Information Law, depending upon the nature of the plan. For instance, if a plan involves the services of a public defender, I believe that the records maintained by an office of public defender would fall within the scope of the Freedom of Information Law (see County Law, §716), for that office in my view would constitute an "agency" as defined in §86(3) of the Freedom of Information Law. However, if it involves services rendered by private attorneys or associations, those persons or entities would not in my view constitute agencies subject to the Freedom of Information Law.
With respect to rights of access, as a general matter, the
Freedom of Information Law is based upon a presumption of access.
Stated differently, all records of an agency are available, except
to the extent that records or portions thereof fall within one or more grounds for denial appearing in §87(2)(a) through (i) of the Law. Since I am unaware of the contents of the records in which
you are interested, or the effects of their disclosure, I cannot offer specific guidance. Nevertheless, the following paragraphs will review the provisions that may be significant in determining rights of access to the records in question.
With respect to criminal history records, the repository of
those records is the Division of Criminal Justice Services. While
the subject of a criminal history record may obtain such record
from the Division, it has been held that criminal history records maintained by that agency are exempted from public disclosure pursuant to §87(2)(a) of the Freedom of Information Law [Capital Newspapers v. Poklemba, Supreme Court, Albany County, April 6, 1989]. Nevertheless, if, for example, criminal conviction records were used in conjunction with a criminal proceeding by a district attorney, it has been held that the district attorney must disclose
those records [see Thompson v. Weinstein, 150 AD 2d 782 (1989); also Geames v. Henry, 173 AD 2d 825 (1991)]. It is also noted that while records relating to convictions may be available from the courts or other sources, when charges are dismissed in favor of an
accused, records relating to those events are generally sealed
pursuant to §160.50 of the Criminal Procedure Law.
Of potential significance regarding the kinds of records in
which you are interested is §87(2)(b) of the Freedom of Information
Law, which permits an agency to withhold records or portions
thereof when disclosure would constitute "an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy". That provision might be applicable relative to the deletion of identifying details in a variety of situations, i.e., where a record identifies a confidential source or a witness, for example.
Perhaps the most relevant provision concerning access to records maintained by law enforcement agencies is §87(2)(e), which permits an agency to withhold records that:
"are compiled for law enforcement purposes and which, if disclosed, would:
i. interfere with law enforcement investigations or judicial proceedings;
ii. deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication;
iii. identify a confidential source or disclose confidential information relating to a criminal investigation; or
iv. reveal criminal investigative techniques
or procedures, except routine techniques and
In my view, the foregoing indicates that records compiled for law
enforcement purposes can only be withheld to the extent that
disclosure would result in the harmful effects described in sub-
paragraphs (i) through (iv) of §87(2)(e).
Another possible ground for denial is §87(2)(f), which permits withholding to the extent that disclosure "would endanger the life or safety of any person". The capacity to withhold on that basis is dependent upon the facts and circumstances concerning an event.
The last relevant ground for denial is §87(2)(g). The cited provision permits an agency to withhold records that:
or intra-agency materials
which are not:
i. statistical or factual tabulations or data;
ii. instructions to staff that affect the public;
iii. final agency policy or determinations; or
iv. external audits, including but not limited to audits performed by the comptroller and the federal government... "
It is noted that the language quoted above contains what in effect
is a double negative. While inter-agency or intra-agency materials
may be withheld, portions of such materials consisting of
statistical or factual information, instructions to staff that affect the public, final agency policy or determinations or external audits must be made available, unless a different ground
for denial applies. Concurrently, those portions of inter-agency or intra-agency materials that are reflective of opinion, advice, recommendation and the like could in my view be withheld.
Records prepared by employees of an agency and communicated within the agency or to another agency would in my view fall within the scope of §87(2)(g). Those records might include opinions or recommendations, for example, that could be withheld.
I point out that in a decision concerning a request for
records maintained by the office of a district attorney that would
ordinarily be exempted from disclosure under the Freedom of
Information Law, it was held that "once the statements have been used in open court, they have lost their cloak of confidentiality and are available for inspection by a member of the public" [see
Moore v. Santucci, 151 AD 2d 677, 679 (1989)]. Based upon that decision, it appears that records introduced into evidence or disclosed during a public judicial proceeding should be available.
However, in the same decision, it was also found that:
"...if the petitioner or his attorney
previously received a copy of the agency
record pursuant to an alternative discovery
device and currently possesses the copy, a
court may uphold an agency's denial of the
petitioner's request under the FOIL for a
duplicate copy as academic. However, the
burden of proof rests with the agency to
demonstrate that the petitioner's specific
requests are moot. The respondent's burden would be satisfied upon proof that a copy of
the requested record was previously furnished to the petitioner or his counsel in the
absence of any allegation, in evidentiary form, that the copy was no longer in existence. In the event the petitioner's request for a copy of a specific record is not moot, the agency must furnish another copy upon payment of the appropriate fee...unless the requested record falls squarely within the ambit of 1 of the 8 statutory exemptions" (id., 678).
Lastly, I believe that the dates of one's public employment
are a matter of public record. Further, based on the judicial
interpretation of the Freedom of Information Law, in situations in
which allegations or charges have resulted in the issuance of a written reprimand, disciplinary action, or findings that public employees have engaged in misconduct, records reflective of those
kinds of determinations have been found to be available, including the names of those who are the subjects of disciplinary action [see Powhida v. City of Albany, 147 AD 2d 236 (1989); also Farrell, Geneva Printing, Scaccia and Sinicropi, supra]. It is also noted, however, that in Scaccia, it was found that although a final determination reflective of a finding of misconduct is public, the records leading to the determination could be withheld. Further, when allegations or charges of misconduct have not yet been determined or did not result in disciplinary action, the records relating to such allegations may, in my view, be withheld, for disclosure would result in an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [see e.g., Herald Company v. School District of City of Syracuse, 430 NYS 2d 460 (1980)]. Therefore, to the extent that charges are dismissed or allegations are found to be without merit, I believe that the records related to and including such charges or allegations may be withheld.
I hope that I have been of some assistance.
Robert J. Freeman