Mr. Bruce S. Paskoff
Ms. Edna K. Paskoff
218 Sussex Road
Elmont, NY 11003
The staff of the Committee on Open Government is authorized to issue advisory opinions. The ensuing staff advisory opinion is based solely upon the information presented in your correspondence.
Dear Mr. and Ms. Paskoff:
I have received your letter of July 8 and a variety of related materials. You have raised a series of issues pertaining the implementation of the Open Meetings and Freedom of Information Laws by the Elmont Union Free School District and its Board of Education. Rather than reiterating the facts and circumstances that precipitated your expressions of concern, in the following commentary, I will attempt to deal with the issues by means of discussing applicable provisions of law and their judicial interpretation.
First, by way of background, it is emphasized that the definition of "meeting" [see Open Meetings Law, §102(1)] has been broadly interpreted by the courts. In a landmark decision rendered in 1978, the Court of Appeals, the state's highest court, found that any gathering of a quorum of a public body for the purpose of conducting public business is a "meeting" that must be convened open to the public, whether or not there is an intent to take action and regardless of the manner in which a gathering may be characterized [see Orange County Publications v. Council of the City of Newburgh, 60 AD 2d 409, aff'd 45 NY 2d 947 (1978)].
I point out that the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals was precipitated by contentions made by public bodies that so-called "work sessions" and similar gatherings held for the purpose of discussion, but without an intent to take action, fell outside the scope of the Open Meetings Law. In discussing the issue, the Appellate Division, whose determination was unanimously affirmed by the Court of Appeals, stated that:
"We believe that the Legislature intended to include more than the mere formal act of voting or the formal execution of an official document. Every step of the decision-making process, including the decision itself, is a necessary preliminary to formal action. Formal acts have always been matters of public record and the public has always been made aware of how its officials have voted on an issue. There would be no need for this law if this was all the Legislature intended. Obviously, every thought, as well as every affirmative act of a public official as it relates to and is within the scope of one's official duties is a matter of public concern. It is the entire decision-making process that the Legislature intended to affect by the enactment of this statute" (60 AD 2d 409, 415).
The court also dealt with the characterization of meetings as "informal," stating that:
"The word 'formal' is defined merely as 'following or according with established form, custom, or rule' (Webster's Third New Int. Dictionary). We believe that it was inserted to safeguard the rights of members of a public body to engage in ordinary social transactions, but not to permit the use of this safeguard as a vehicle by which it precludes the application of the law to gatherings which have as their true purpose the discussion of the business of a public body" (id.).
Based upon the direction given by the courts, if a majority of a board of education gathers to discuss school district business, in their capacities as board members, any such gathering, in my opinion, would constitute a "meeting" subject to the Open Meetings Law. Further, if the Board intends to gather to discuss public business prior to its scheduled meeting, and if a majority of its members is present, such a gathering in my view would be a "meeting" that falls within the requirements of the Law that should be preceded by notice.
Second, §104 of the Open Meetings Law pertains to notice of meetings and states that:
"1. Public notice of the time and place of a meeting scheduled at least one week prior thereto shall be given to the news media and shall be conspicuously posted in one or more designated public locations at least seventy-two hours before each meeting.
2. Public notice of the time and place of every other meeting shall be given, to the extent practicable, to the news media and shall be conspicuously posted in one or more designated public locations at a reasonable time prior thereto.
3. The public notice provided for by this section shall not be construed to require publication as a legal notice."
Based on the foregoing, a public body is not required to pay to place an advertisement prior to a meeting. However, it is clear that notice must be given to the news media prior to every meeting and include reference to the "time and place" of a meeting. Further, any such notice must be "conspicuously posted in one or more designated public locations," and I believe that a public body must designate, presumably by resolution, the location or locations where it will routinely post notice of meetings. To meet the requirement that notice be "conspicuously posted", notice must in my view be placed at a location that is visible to the public.
Third, the phrase "executive session" is defined in §102(3) of the Open Meetings Law to mean a portion of an open meeting during which the public may be excluded. As such, an executive session is not separate and distinct from a meeting, but rather is a portion of an open meeting. The Law also contains a procedure that must be accomplished during an open meeting before an executive session may be held. Specifically, §105(1) states in relevant part that:
"Upon a majority vote of its total membership, taken in an open meeting pursuant to a motion identifying the general area or areas of the subject or subjects to be considered, a public body may conduct an executive session for the below enumerated purposes only..."
As indicated in the language quoted above, a motion to enter into an executive session must be made during an open meeting and include reference to the "general area or areas of the subject or subjects to be considered" during the executive session.
It has been consistently advised that a public body, in a technical sense, cannot schedule or conduct an executive session in advance of a meeting, because a vote to enter into an executive session must be taken at an open meeting during which the executive session is held. In a decision involving the propriety of scheduling executive sessions prior to meetings, it was held that:
"The respondent Board prepared an agenda for each of the five designated regularly scheduled meetings in advance of the time that those meetings were to be held. Each agenda listed 'executive session' as an item of business to be undertaken at the meeting. The petitioner claims that this procedure violates the Open Meetings Law because under the provisions of Public Officers Law section 100 provides that a public body cannot schedule an executive session in advance of the open meeting. Section 100 provides that a public body may conduct an executive session only for certain enumerated purposes after a majority vote of the total membership taken at an open meeting has approved a motion to enter into such a session. Based upon this, it is apparent that petitioner is technically correct in asserting that the respondent cannot decide to enter into an executive session or schedule such a session in advance of a proper vote for the same at an open meeting" [Doolittle, Matter of v. Board of Education, Sup. Cty., Chemung Cty., July 21, 1981; note: the Open Meetings Law has been renumbered and §100 is now §105].
For the reasons expressed in the preceding commentary, a public body cannot in my view schedule an executive session in advance of a meeting. In short, because a vote to enter into an executive session must be made and carried by a majority vote of the total membership during an open meeting, technically, it cannot be known in advance of that vote that the motion will indeed be approved. However, an alternative method of achieving the desired result that would comply with the letter of the law has been suggested. Rather than scheduling an executive session, the Superintendent or the Board on its agenda or notice of a meeting could refer to or schedule a motion to enter into executive session to discuss certain subjects. Reference to a motion to conduct an executive session would not represent an assurance that an executive session would ensue, but rather that there is an intent to enter into an executive session by means of a vote to be taken during a meeting.
Fourth, based upon the language of the Open Meetings Law and its judicial interpretation, motions to conduct executive sessions citing the subjects to be considered as "personnel", "litigation" or "negotiations", for example, without additional detail, are inadequate. The use of those kinds of terms alone do not provide members of public bodies or members of the public who attend meetings with enough information to know whether a proposed executive session will indeed be properly held.
Although it is used frequently, the term "personnel" appears nowhere in the Open Meetings Law. Although one of the grounds for entry into executive session often relates to personnel matters, from my perspective, the term is overused and is frequently cited in a manner that is misleading or causes unnecessary confusion. To be sure, some issues involving "personnel" may be properly considered in an executive session; others, in my view, cannot. Further, certain matters that have nothing to do with personnel may be discussed in private under the provision that is ordinarily cited to discuss personnel.
The language of the so-called "personnel" exception, §105(1)(f) of the Open Meetings Law, is limited and precise. In terms of legislative history, as originally enacted, the provision in question permitted a public body to enter into an executive session to discuss:
"...the medical, financial, credit or employment history of any person or corporation, or matters leading to the appointment, employment, promotion, demotion, discipline, suspension, dismissal or removal of any person or corporation..."
Under the language quoted above, public bodies often convened executive sessions to discuss matters that dealt with "personnel" generally, tangentially, or in relation to policy concerns. However, the Committee consistently advised that the provision was intended largely to protect privacy and not to shield matters of policy under the guise of privacy.
To attempt to clarify the Law, the Committee recommended a series of amendments to the Open Meetings Law, several of which became effective on October 1, 1979. The recommendation made by the Committee regarding §105(1)(f) was enacted and states that a public body may enter into an executive session to discuss:
"...the medical, financial, credit or employment history of a particular person or corporation, or matters leading to the appointment, employment, promotion, demotion, discipline, suspension, dismissal or removal of a particular person or corporation..." (emphasis added).
Due to the insertion of the term "particular" in §105(1)(f), I believe that a discussion of "personnel" may be considered in an executive session only when the subject involves a particular person or persons, and only when at least one of the topics listed in §105(1)(f) is considered.
Insofar as a discussion involves a particular person in relation to one or more of the subjects described in §105(1)(f), an executive session may in my opinion be justifiably held. On the other hand, to the extent that a discussion involves consideration or review of procedures, policies or practices, or the creation, elimination or functions of an office or certain positions, irrespective of who might hold those positions, I do not believe that there would be a basis for discussion in executive session. Even though those kinds of subjects might be reflective of "specific personnel" issues, they would not focus on any particular person and, therefore, in my opinion, should be discussed in public.
The language of a motion to enter into executive session pursuant to §105(1)(f) should be based on the specific terms of that provision. For instance, a proper motion might be: "I move to enter into an executive session to discuss the employment history of a particular person (or persons)". Such a motion would not in my opinion have to identify the person or persons who may be the subject of a discussion. By means of the kind of motion suggested above, members of a public body and others in attendance would have the ability to know that there is a proper basis for entry into an executive session. Absent such detail, neither the members nor others may be able to determine whether the subject may properly be considered behind closed doors.
It is noted that the Appellate Division, Second Department, recently confirmed the advice rendered by this office. In discussing §105(1)(f) in relation to a matter involving the establishment and functions of a position, the Court stated that:
"...the public body must identify the subject matter to be discussed (See, Public Officers Law § 105 ), and it is apparent that this must be accomplished with some degree of particularity, i.e., merely reciting the statutory language is insufficient (see, Daily Gazette Co. v Town Bd., Town of Cobleskill, 111 Misc 2d 303, 304-305). Additionally, the topics discussed during the executive session must remain within the exceptions enumerated in the statute (see generally, Matter of Plattsburgh Publ. Co., Div. of Ottaway Newspapers v City of Plattsburgh, 185 AD2d §18), and these exceptions, in turn, 'must be narrowly scrutinized, lest the article's clear mandate be thwarted by thinly veiled references to the areas delineated thereunder' (Weatherwax v Town of Stony Point, 97 AD2d 840, 841, quoting Daily Gazette Co. v Town Bd., Town of Cobleskill, supra, at 304; see, Matter of Orange County Publs., Div. of Ottaway Newspapers v County of Orange, 120 AD2d 596, lv dismissed 68 NY 2d 807).
"Applying these principles to the matter before us, it is apparent that the Board's stated purpose for entering into executive session, to wit, the discussion of a 'personnel issue', does not satisfy the requirements of Public Officers Law § 105 (1) (f). The statute itself requires, with respect to personnel matters, that the discussion involve the 'employment history of a particular person" (id. [emphasis supplied]). Although this does not mandate that the individual in question be identified by name, it does require that any motion to enter into executive session describe with some detail the nature of the proposed discussion (see, State Comm on Open Govt Adv Opn dated Apr. 6, 1993), and we reject respondents' assertion that the Board's reference to a 'personnel issue' is the functional equivalent of identifying 'a particular person'" [Gordon v. Village of Monticello, 620 NY 2d 573, 575; AD 2d ___ (December 29, 1994)].
Another ground for entry into executive session frequently cited relates to "litigation". Again, that kind of minimal description of the subject matter to be discussed would be insufficient to comply with the Law. The provision that deals with litigation is §105(1)(d) of the Open Meetings Law, which permits a public body to enter into an executive session to discuss "proposed, pending or current litigation". In construing the language quoted above, it has been held that:
"The purpose of paragraph d is "to enable is to enable a public body to discuss pending litigation privately, without baring its strategy to its adversary through mandatory public meetings' (Matter of Concerned Citizens to Review Jefferson Val. Mall v. Town Bd. Of Town of Yorktown, 83 AD 2d 612, 613, 441 NYS 2d 292). The belief of the town's attorney that a decision adverse to petitioner 'would almost certainly lead to litigation' does not justify the conducting of this public business in an executive session. To accept this argument would be to accept the view that any public body could bar the public from its meetings simply be expressing the fear that litigation may result from actions taken therein. Such a view would be contrary to both the letter and the spirit of the exception" [Weatherwax v. Town of Stony Point, 97 AD 2d 840, 841 (1983)].
Based upon the foregoing, I believe that the exception is intended to permit a public body to discuss its litigation strategy behind closed doors, rather than issues that might eventually result in litigation. Since legal matters or possible litigation could be the subject or result of nearly any topic discussed by a public body, an executive session could not in my view be held to discuss an issue merely because there is a possibility of litigation, or because it involves a legal matter.
With regard to the sufficiency of a motion to discuss litigation, it has been held that:
"It is insufficient to merely regurgitate the statutory language; to wit, 'discussions regarding proposed, pending or current litigation'. This boilerplate recitation does not comply with the intent of the statute. To validly convene an executive session for discussion of proposed, pending or current litigation, the public body must identify with particularity the pending, proposed or current litigation to be discussed during the executive session" [Daily Gazette Co. , Inc. v. Town Board, Town of Cobleskill, 44 NYS 2d 44, 46 (1981), emphasis added by court].
Similarly, with respect to "contractual matters" or "negotiations", the only ground for entry into executive session that mentions that term is §105(1)(e). That provision permits a public body to conduct an executive session to discuss "collective negotiations pursuant to article fourteen of the civil service law." Article 14 of the Civil Service Law is commonly known as the "Taylor Law", which pertains to the relationship between public employers and public employee unions. As such, §105(1)(e) permits a public body to hold executive sessions to discuss collective bargaining negotiations with a public employee union.
In terms of a motion to enter into an executive session held pursuant to §105(1)(e), it has been held that:
"Concerning 'negotiations', Public Officers Law section 100[e] permits a public body to enter into executive session to discuss collective negotiations under Article 14 of the Civil Service Law. As the term 'negotiations' can cover a multitude of areas, we believe that the public body should make it clear that the negotiations to be discussed in executive session involve Article 14 of the Civil Service Law" [Doolittle, supra].
It is unclear on the basis of the minutes whether the Board took action during executive sessions. In this regard, I point out that, as a general rule, a public body may take action during a properly convened executive session [see Open Meetings Law, §105(1)]. If action is taken during an executive session, minutes reflective of the action, the date and the vote must be recorded in minutes pursuant to §106(2) of the Law. If no action is taken, there is no requirement that minutes of the executive session be prepared. Nevertheless, various interpretations of the Education Law, §1708(3), indicate that, except in situations in which action during a closed session is permitted or required by statute, a school board cannot take action during an executive session [see United Teachers of Northport v. Northport Union Free School District, 50 AD 2d 897 (1975); Kursch et al. v. Board of Education, Union Free School District #1, Town of North Hempstead, Nassau County, 7 AD 2d 922 (1959); Sanna v. Lindenhurst, 107 Misc. 2d 267, modified 85 AD 2d 157, aff'd 58 NY 2d 626 (1982)]. Stated differently, based upon judicial interpretations of the Education Law, a school board generally cannot vote during an executive session, except in rare circumstances in which a statute permits or requires such a vote.
Lastly, one of the issues concerns access to records involving expenditures and reimbursements, particularly to Board members. Here I direct your attention to the Freedom of Information Law. In brief, that statute is based upon a presumption of access. Stated differently, all records of an agency are available, except to the extent that records or portions thereof fall within one or more grounds for denial appearing in §87(2)(a) through (i) of the Law. In my opinion, only of the grounds for denial is pertinent to an analysis of rights of access to those kinds of documents. While that provision might permit that certain aspects of the records in question may be withheld, I believe that the remainder must be disclosed.
Specifically, §87(2)(b) of the Freedom of Information Law permits an agency to withhold records to the extent that disclosure would constitute "an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." Although the standard concerning privacy is flexible and subject to a variety of interpretations, the courts have provided direction through their review of challenges to agencies' denials of access. In brief, it is clear that public officers and employees enjoy a lesser degree of privacy than others, for it has been found in various contexts that public officers and employees are required to be more accountable than others. Further, it has been held that, as a general rule, records that are relevant to the performance of a their official duties are available, for disclosure in such instances would result in a permissible rather than an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [see e.g., Farrell v. Village Board of Trustees, 372 NYS 2d 905 (1975); Gannett Co. v. County of Monroe, 59 AD 2d 309 (1977), aff'd 45 NY 2d 954 (1978); Sinicropi v. County of Nassau, 76 AD 2d 838 (1980); Geneva Printing Co. and Donald C. Hadley v. Village of Lyons, Sup. Ct., Wayne Cty., March 25, 1981; Montes v. State, 406 NYS 2d 664 (Court of Claims, 1978); Powhida v. City of Albany, 147 AD 2d 236 (1989); Scaccia v. NYS Division of State Police, 530 NYS 2d 309, 138 AD 2d 50 (1988); Steinmetz v. Board of Education, East Moriches, supra; Capital Newspapers v. Burns, 67 NY 2d 562 (1986)]. Conversely, to the extent that records are irrelevant to the performance of one's official duties, it has been found that disclosure would indeed constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [see e.g., Matter of Wool, Sup. Ct., Nassau Cty., NYLJ, Nov. 22, 1977].
In the context of the records at issue, I believe that they are clearly relevant to the performance of the official duties of Board members and other District officials. Consequently, with the exception of personal details, they must in my view be disclosed. Examples of the kinds of personal details that could be deleted prior to disclosure of the remainder of the records would be such items as home addresses, social security numbers and personal credit card numbers. It also noted that although the front side of cancelled checks have been found to be public, it has been held that the back of the checks may be withheld on the ground that disclosure would result in an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. The court found, in essence, that inspection of the back of a check could indicate how an individual chooses to spend his or her money, which is irrelevant to the performance of that person's duties(see Minerva v. Village of Valley Stream, Supreme Court, Nassau County, May 20, 1981).
In conjunction with the preceding remarks concerning access to records, I direct you to a statement concerning the intent and utility of the Freedom of Information Law, the Court of Appeals, the State's highest court, found that:
"The Freedom of Information Law expresses this State's strong commitment to open government and public accountability and imposes a broad standard of disclosure upon the State and its agencies (see, Matter of Farbman & Sons v New York City Health and Hosps. Corp., 62 NY 2d 75, 79). The statute, enacted in furtherance of the public's vested and inherent 'right to know', affords all citizens the means to obtain information concerning the day-to-day functioning of State and local government thus providing the electorate with sufficient information 'to make intelligent, informed choices with respect to both the direction and scope of governmental activities' and with an effective tool for exposing waste, negligence and abuse on the part of government officers" (Capital Newspapers v. Burns, supra, 565-566).
Based on the foregoing, I believe that the need to enable the public to make informed choices and provide a mechanism for exposing waste or abuse can be balanced against the possible infringement upon the privacy of present or former public officers or employees in a manner consistent with the preceding commentary.
In an effort to enhance compliance with and understanding of the Open Meetings and Freedom of Information Laws, a copy of this opinion will be sent to the Board of Education.
I hope that I have been of some assistance.
Robert J. Freeman
cc: Board of Education