December 26, 1995
Ms. Doris E. Roth
McMillan, Rather, Bennett & Rigano, P.C.
395 North Service Road
Melville, NY 11747
The staff of the Committee on Open Government is authorized to issue advisory opinions. The ensuing staff advisory opinion is based solely upon the information presented in your correspondence.
Dear Ms. Roth:
I have received your letter of December 5 in which you sought an advisory opinion on behalf of your client, the Central Pine Barrens Joint Planning and Policy Commission ("the Commission").
The Commission is a statutory body created pursuant to §57-0119 of the Environmental Conservation Law "to plan, manage and oversee land use within the Central Pine Barrens area of Long Island Pine Barrens Maritime reserve..." As required by law, you wrote that the Commission has prepared an inventory of all privately owned real property in the Core Preservation Area, and another similar list involving property in the Compatible Growth Area. The lists include the tax map parcel and the names and addresses of the corresponding property owners. You added that maps of the Central Pine Barrens are available for public sale that indicate the precise boundaries of the Core Preservation and Compatible Growth Areas and that it is possible, "albeit not without a very substantial effort, to recreate the inventory based upon these maps."
Having received a request for the lists, the Commission's executive director informed the applicant, a law firm, that the records could be withheld if they would be used for commercial or fund-raising purposes and requested a certification from the applicant that the applicant would not use the lists for either of those purposes. No such certification was given, and the applicant appealed. You have asked "whether the Commission may lawfully deny the request on the ground that the certification was not provided."
In this regard, I offer the following comments.
First, the Freedom of Information Law pertains to all agency records and is based upon a presumption of access. Stated differently, all records of an agency are available, except to the extent that records or portions thereof fall within one or more grounds for denial appearing in §87(2)(a) through (i) of the Law.
Second, as a general matter, when records are accessible under the Freedom of Information Law, it has been held that they should be made equally available to any person, regardless of one's status, interest or the intended use of the records [see Burke v. Yudelson, 368 NYS 2d 779, aff'd 51 AD 2d 673, 378 NYS 2d 165 (1976)]. Moreover, the Court of Appeals has held that:
"FOIL does not require that the party requesting records make any showing of need, good faith or legitimate purpose; while its purpose may be to shed light on government decision-making, its ambit is not confined to records actually used in the decision-making process. (Matter of Westchester Rockland Newspapers v. Kimball, 50 NY2d 575, 581.) Full disclosure by public agencies is, under FOIL, a public right and in the public interest, irrespective of the status or need of the person making the request" [Farbman v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation, 62 NY 2d 75, 80 (1984)].
Farbman pertained to a situation in which a person involved in litigation against an agency requested records from that agency under the Freedom of Information Law. In brief, it was found that one's status as a litigant had no effect upon that person's right as a member of the public when using the Freedom of Information Law, irrespective of the intended use of the records. Similarly, unless there is a basis for withholding records in accordance with the grounds for denial appearing in §87(2), the use of the records, including the potential for commercial use, is in my opinion irrelevant; when records are accessible, once they are disclosed, the recipient may do with the records as he or she sees fit.
Third, the only exception to the principles described above involves the protection of personal privacy. By way of background, §87(2)(b) of the Freedom of Information Law permits an agency to withhold records to the extent that disclosure would constitute "an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." Further, §89(2)(b) of the Law provides a series of examples of unwarranted invasions of personal privacy, one of which pertains to:
"sale or release of lists of names and addresses if such lists would be used for commercial or fund-raising purposes" [§89(2)(b)(iii)].
The provision quoted above represents what might be viewed as an internal conflict in the law. As indicated earlier, the status of an applicant or the purposes for which a request is made are irrelevant to rights of access, and an agency cannot inquire as to the intended use of records. However, due to the language of §89(2)(b)(iii), rights of access to a list of names and addresses, or equivalent records, may be contingent upon the purpose for which a request is made [see Scott, Sardano & Pomeranz v. Records Access Officer of Syracuse, 65 NY 2d 294, 491 NYS 2d 289 (1985); Federation of New York State Rifle and Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. New York City Police Dept., 73 NY 2d 92 (1989); Goodstein v. Shaw, 463 NYS 2d 162 (1983)].
As you are aware, in a case involving a list of names and addresses in which the agency inquired as to the purpose for which the list was requested, it was found that an agency could make such an inquiry. Specifically, in Golbert v. Suffolk County Department of Consumer Affairs (Supreme Court, Suffolk County, September 5, 1980), the Court cited and apparently relied upon an opinion rendered by this office in which it was advised that an agency may appropriately require that an applicant for a list of names and addresses provide an indication of the purpose for which a list is sought. In that decision, it was stated that:
"The Court agrees with petitioner's attorney that nowhere in the record does it appear that petitioner intends to use the information sought for commercial or fund-raising purposes. However, the reason for that deficiency in the record is that all efforts by respondents to receive petitioner's assurance that the information sought would not be so used apparently were unsuccessful. Without that assurance the respondents could reasonably infer that petitioner did want to use the information for commercial or fund-raising purposes."
Moreover, it was held that:
"[U]nder the circumstances, the Court finds that it was not unreasonable for respondents to require petitioner to submit a certification that the information sought would not be used for commercial purposes. Petitioner has failed to establish that the respondents denial or petitioner's request for information constituted an abuse of discretion as a matter of law, and the Court declines to substitute its judgement for that of the respondents" (id.).
As such, there is precedent indicating that an agency may inquire with respect to the purpose of a request when the request involves a list of names and addresses. Again, that situation represents the only case under the Freedom of Information Law in which an agency may inquire as to the purpose for which a request is made, or in which the intended use of the record has a bearing upon rights of access. On the basis of Golbert and the language of §89(2)(b)(iii), I believe that the Commission may withheld the lists, absent the submission of a certification in writing in which it is asserted that the records in question would not be used for commercial or fund-raising purposes.
The foregoing is based on the assumption that the lists include reference to the names and addresses of the owners of residential property. If a list pertains to commercial entities or commercial properties only, the provisions concerning the protection of privacy would not apply. Those provisions in my view are pertinent only when records identify natural persons.
Also of potential significance is the Personal Privacy Protection Law, which deals in part with the disclosure of records or personal information by state agencies concerning data subjects. A "data subject" is "any natural person about whom personal information has been collected by an agency" [Personal Privacy Protection Law, §92(3)]. "Personal information" is defined to mean "any information concerning a data subject which, because of name, number, symbol, mark or other identifier, can be used to identify that data subject" [§92(7)]. For purposes of the Personal Privacy Protection Law, the term "record" is defined to mean "any item, collection or grouping of personal information about a data subject which is maintained and is retrievable by use of the name or other identifier of the data subject" [§92(9)].
With respect to disclosure, §96(1) of the Personal Privacy Protection Law states that "No agency may disclose any record or personal information", except in conjunction with a series of exceptions that follow. One of those exceptions involves when a record is "subject to article six of this chapter [the Freedom of Information Law], unless disclosure of such information would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy as defined in paragraph (a) of subdivision two of section eighty-nine of this chapter". Section 89(2-a) of the Freedom of Information Law states that "Nothing in this article shall permit disclosure which constitutes an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy as defined in subdivision two of this section if such disclosure is prohibited under section ninety-six of this chapter". Therefore, if a state agency cannot disclose records pursuant to §96 of the Personal Protection Law, it is precluded from disclosing under the Freedom of Information Law.
As indicated earlier, the Personal Privacy Protection Law applies to state agencies, and, for purposes of that statute, §92(1) defines the term "agency" to mean:
"any state board, bureau, committee, commission, council, department, public authority, public benefit corporation, division, office or any other governmental entity performing a governmental or proprietary function for the state of New York, except the judiciary or the state legislature or any unit of local government and shall not include offices of district attorneys."
The Commission, based on the means by which it was created, appears to be a state agency subject to the Personal Privacy Protection Law. If that is so, and if it is determined that disclosure of the records in question would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, the Commission could not disclose the records.
I hope that I have been of assistance. Should any further questions arise, please feel free to contact me.
Robert J. Freeman