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March 30, 1999

Mr. Peter W. Sluys
Editor-in-chief
Rockland County Times
14 East Central Avenue
P.O. 510
Pearl River, NY 10965

The staff of the Committee on Open Government is authorized to issue advisory opinions.
The ensuing staff advisory opinion is based solely upon the information presented in your
correspondence.

Dear Mr. Sluys:

I have received your letter of March 16 in which you questioned the validity of advice
rendered by this office in relation to the assertion of the attorney-client privilege during a
meeting.

In this regard, there are two vehicles that may authorize a public body to discuss public business in private. One involves entry into an executive session. Section 102(3) of
the Open Meetings Law defines the phrase "executive session" to mean a portion of an open meeting during which the public may be excluded, and the Law requires that a procedure be accomplished, during an open meeting, before a public body may enter into an executive session. Specifically, §105(1) states in relevant part that:

"Upon a majority vote of its total membership, taken in an open meeting pursuant to a motion identifying the general area or areas of the subject or subjects to be considered, a public body may conduct an executive session for the below enumerated purposes only..."

As such, a motion to conduct an executive session must include reference to the subject or
subjects to be discussed and the motion must be carried by majority vote of a public body's
membership before such a session may validly be held. The ensuing provisions of §105(1)
specify and limit the subjects that may appropriately be considered during an executive
session. Therefore, a public body may not conduct an executive session to discuss the subject of its choice.

The other vehicle for excluding the public from a meeting involves "exemptions." Section 108 of the Open Meetings Law contains three exemptions. When an exemption applies, the Open Meetings Law does not, and the requirements that would operate with respect to executive sessions are not in effect. Stated differently, to discuss a matter exempted from the Open Meetings Law, a public body need not follow the procedure imposed by §105(1) that relates to entry into an executive session. Further, although executive sessions may be held only for particular purposes, there is no such limitation that relates to matters that are exempt from the coverage of the Open Meetings Law.

Relevant to the matter is §108(3), which exempts from the Open Meetings Law:

"...any matter made confidential by federal or state law."

When an attorney-client relationship has been invoked, it is considered confidential under
§4503 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. Therefore, if an attorney and client establish a
privileged relationship, the communications made pursuant to that relationship would in my
view be confidential under state law and, therefore, exempt from the Open Meetings Law.

In terms of background, it has long been held that a municipal board may establish a
privileged relationship with its attorney [People ex rel. Updyke v. Gilon, 9 NYS 243 (1889); Pennock v. Lane, 231 NYS 2d 897, 898 (1962)]. However, such a relationship is in my opinion operable only when a municipal board or official seeks the legal advice of an attorney acting in his or her capacity as an attorney, and where there is no waiver of the privilege by the client.

In a judicial determination that described the parameters of the attorney-client relationship and the conditions precedent to its initiation, it was held that:

"In general, 'the privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion
on law or (ii) legal services (iii) assistance in some legal proceedings, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and
(b) not waived by the client'" [People v. Belge, 59 AD 2d 307, 399, NYS 2d 539, 540 (1977)].

Insofar as a public body seeks legal advice from its attorney and the attorney renders
legal advice, I believe that the attorney-client privilege may validly be asserted and that
communications made within the scope of the privilege would be outside the coverage of the Open Meetings Law. Therefore, even though there may be no basis for conducting an
executive session pursuant to §105 of the Open Meetings Law, a private discussion might
validly be held based on the proper assertion of the attorney-client privilege pursuant to §108, and legal advice may be requested even though litigation is not an issue. In that case, while the litigation exception for entry into executive session would not apply, there may be a proper assertion of the attorney-client privilege.

There are several decisions in which the assertion of the attorney-client privilege has been recognized as a means of closing a meeting. In Cioci v. Mondello (Supreme Court, Nassau County, March 18, 1991), the issue involved the ability of a county board of supervisors to seek the legal advice of its attorney in private, and the court stated that "Clearly, the Supervisors' discussions with the County Attorney...are exempt from the provisions of the Open Meetings Law (see POL §108(3), CPLR §4503...)". In another decision citing §108(3), it was found that "any confidential communications between the board and its counsel, at the time counsel allegedly advised the Board of the legal issues involved in the determination of the variance application, were exempt from the provisions of the Open Meetings Law" [Young v. Board of Appeals, 194 AD2d 796, 599 NYS2d 632, 634 (1993)].

Notwithstanding the foregoing, it has been advised by this office and held judicially that the authority to assert the attorney-client privilege as an exemption from the coverage
Committee, the court in White v. Kimball (Supreme Court, Chautauqua County, January 27, 1997) found that:

"While there is no question that Executive Sessions can be conducted for proper reasons and that an exception exists under the Open Meetings Law for attorney-client privileged
communications, the scope of that privilege is limited. Once the legal advice is offered, discussions with regard to substance (e.g.) the closing date of a bus system, do not fall
within the privilege of the exception. See Exhibit C, April 8, 1996 Open Meetings Law Advisory Opinion #2595, Robert J. Freeman, Executive Director of Committee on Open
government at page 4: "I note that the mere presence of an attorney does not signify the existence of an attorney-client relationship; in order to assert the attorney-client privilege, the attorney must in my view be providing services in which the expertise of an attorney is needed and sought.

Further, if at some point in a discussion, the attorney stops giving legal advice and a public
body may begin discussing or deliberating independent of the attorney. When that point
is reached, I believe that the attorney-client privilege has ended and that the body should
return to an open meeting."

I hope that the foregoing serves to clarify your understanding of the issue and that I have been of assistance.

Sincerely,

Robert J. Freeman
Executive Director

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