September 24, 2001
The staff of the Committee on Open Government is authorized to issue advisory opinions. The
ensuing staff advisory opinion is based solely upon the information presented in your
I have received your letter of August 21 and the materials attached to it. You have contended that the Board of Education of the Honeoye Central School District has, in a variety of areas, failed to comply with the Open Meetings Law. As you requested, and in an effort to enhance compliance with and understanding of that statute, copies of this opinion will be forwarded to District officials.
Based on your comments and a review of the materials, I offer the following remarks.
Your initial area of complaint involves what you characterized as "misuse of waiver of
notice." In this regard, the only provision of which I am aware that might authorize a waiver of notice is §1606(3) of the Education Law, which states that "A meeting of the board may be ordered by any member thereof, by giving not less than twenty-four hours' notice of the same." The notice referenced in the foregoing deals with notice to members; separate and distinct are the notice requirements imposed by the Open Meetings Law, which, in my view, can never be waived. Specifically, §104 of that statute provides that:
"1. Public notice of the time and place of a meeting scheduled at least one week prior thereto shall be given to the news media and shall be conspicuously posted in one or more designated public locations at least seventy-two hours before each meeting.
2. Public notice of the time and place of every other meeting shall be given, to the extent practicable, to the news media and shall be conspicuously posted in one or more designated public locations at a reasonable time prior thereto.
3. The public notice provided for by this section shall not be construed to require publication as a legal notice."
Stated differently, if a meeting is scheduled at least a week in advance, notice of the time and place must be given to the news media and to the public by means of posting in one or more designated public locations, not less than seventy-two hours prior to the meeting. If a meeting is scheduled less than a week an advance, again, notice of the time and place must be given to the news media and posted in the same manner as described above, "to the extent practicable", at a reasonable time prior to the meeting. Although the Open Meetings Law does not make reference to "special" or "emergency" meetings, if, for example, there is a need to convene quickly, the notice requirements can generally be met by telephoning or faxing notice of the time and place of a meeting to the local news media and by posting notice in one or more designated locations.
Further, the judicial interpretation of the Open Meetings Law suggests that the propriety of
scheduling a meeting less than a week in advance is dependent upon the actual need to do so. As stated in Previdi v. Hirsch:
"Whether abbreviated notice is 'practicable' or 'reasonable' in a given
case depends on the necessity for same. Here, respondents virtually
concede a lack of urgency: They deny petitioner's characterization of
the session as an 'emergency' and maintain nothing of substance was
transacted at the meeting except to discuss the status of litigation and
to authorize, pro forma, their insurance carrier's involvement in negotiations. It is manifest then that the executive session could easily have been scheduled for another date with only minimum delay. In that event respondents could even have provided the more extensive notice required by POL §104(1). Only respondent's choice in scheduling prevented this result.
"Moreover, given the short notice provided by respondents, it should have been apparent that the posting of a single notice in the School District offices would hardly serve to apprise the public that an executive session was being called...
"In White v. Battaglia, 79 A.D. 2d 880, 881, 434 N.Y.S.ed 637, lv. to app. den. 53 N.Y.2d 603, 439 N.Y.S.2d 1027, 421 N.E.2d 854, the Court condemned an almost identical method of notice as one at bar:
"Fay Powell, then president of the board, began contacting board
members at 4:00 p.m. on June 27 to ask them to attend a meeting at
7:30 that evening at the central office, which was not the usual
meeting date or place. The only notice given to the public was one
typewritten announcement posted on the central office bulletin board...Special Term could find on this record that appellants violated the...Public Officers Law...in that notice was not given 'to the extent practicable, to the news media' nor was it 'conspicuously posted in
one or more designated public locations' at a reasonable time 'prior thereto' (emphasis added)" [524 NYS 2d 643, 645 (1988)].
Based upon the foregoing, absent an emergency or urgency, the Court in Previdi suggested that it would be unreasonable to conduct meetings on short notice, unless there is some necessity to do so.
You also contend that the Board has "misused" and "over used" executive sessions. On the basis of the materials that you forwarded, the descriptions of executive sessions in the minutes do not include sufficient detail offer a conclusion. However, as you are likely aware, in general, the Open Meetings Law is based upon a presumption of openness. Stated differently, meetings of public bodies must be conducted open to the public, unless there is a basis for entry into executive session. Moreover, the Law requires that a procedure be accomplished, during an open meeting, before a public body may enter into an executive session. Specifically, §105(1) states in relevant part that:
"Upon a majority vote of its total membership, taken in an open meeting pursuant to a motion identifying the general area or areas of the subject or subjects to be considered, a public body may conduct an executive session for the below enumerated purposes only..."
As such, a motion to conduct an executive session must include reference to the subject or subjects to be discussed, and the motion must be carried by majority vote of a public body's total membership before such a session may validly be held. The ensuing provisions of §105(1) specify and limit the subjects that may appropriately be considered during an executive session.
Although it is used frequently, the term "personnel" appears nowhere in the Open Meetings Law. It is true that one of the grounds for entry into executive session often relates to personnel matters. From my perspective, however, the term is overused and is frequently cited in a manner that is misleading or causes unnecessary confusion. To be sure, some issues involving "personnel" may be properly considered in an executive session; others, in my view, cannot. Further, certain matters that have nothing to do with personnel may be discussed in private under the provision that is ordinarily cited to discuss personnel.
The language of the so-called "personnel" exception, §105(1)(f) of the Open Meetings Law, is limited and precise. In terms of legislative history, as originally enacted, the provision in question permitted a public body to enter into an executive session to discuss:
"...the medical, financial, credit or employment history of any person or corporation, or matters leading to the appointment, employment, promotion, demotion, discipline, suspension, dismissal or removal of any person or corporation..."
Under the language quoted above, public bodies often convened executive sessions to discuss matters that dealt with "personnel" generally, tangentially, or in relation to policy concerns. However, the Committee consistently advised that the provision was intended largely to protect privacy and not to shield matters of policy under the guise of privacy.
To attempt to clarify the Law, the Committee recommended a series of amendments to the Open Meetings Law, several of which became effective on October 1, 1979. The recommendation made by the Committee regarding §105(1)(f) was enacted and states that a public body may enter into an executive session to discuss:
"...the medical, financial, credit or employment history of a particular person or corporation, or matters leading to the appointment, employment, promotion, demotion, discipline, suspension, dismissal or removal of a particular person or corporation..." (emphasis added).
Due to the insertion of the term "particular" in §105(1)(f), I believe that a discussion of "personnel" may be considered in an executive session only when the subject involves a particular person or persons, and only when at least one of the topics listed in §105(1)(f) is considered.
When a discussion concerns matters of policy, such as the manner in which public money
will be expended or allocated, the functions of a department or perhaps the creation or elimination of positions, I do not believe that §105(1)(f) could be asserted, even though the discussion may relate to "personnel". For example, if a discussion involves staff reductions or layoffs due to budgetary concerns, the issue in my view would involve matters of policy. Similarly, if a discussion of possible layoff relates to positions and whether those positions should be retained or abolished, the discussion would involve the means by which public monies would be allocated. In none of the instances described would the focus involve a "particular person" and how well or poorly an individual has performed his or her duties. One of the items noted on the agenda for consideration
in executive session involved the "status of vacant Senior Attendance Officer Position." If the discussion pertained to the position, not any particular person who might fill it, it is doubtful in my view that the matter should have been considered in private.
To reiterate, in order to enter into an executive session pursuant to §105(1)(f), I believe that the discussion must focus on a particular person (or persons) in relation to a topic listed in that provision. As stated judicially, "it would seem that under the statute matters related to personnel generally or to personnel policy should be discussed in public for such matters do not deal with any particular person" (Doolittle v. Board of Education, Supreme Court, Chemung County, October 20, 1981).
It has been advised that a motion describing the subject to be discussed as "personnel" or the like is inadequate, and that the motion should be based upon the specific language of §105(1)(f). For instance, a proper motion might be: "I move to enter into an executive session to discuss the employment history of a particular person (or persons)". Such a motion would not in my opinion have to identify the person or persons who may be the subject of a discussion. By means of the kind of motion suggested above, members of a public body and others in attendance would have the ability to know that there is a proper basis for entry into an executive session. Absent such detail, neither the members nor others may be able to determine whether the subject may properly be considered behind closed doors.
It is noted that the Appellate Division confirmed the advice rendered by this office. In
discussing §105(1)(f) in relation to a matter involving the establishment and functions of a position, the Court stated that:
"...the public body must identify the subject matter to be discussed
(See, Public Officers Law § 105 ), and it is apparent that this must
be accomplished with some degree of particularity, i.e., merely
reciting the statutory language is insufficient (see, Daily Gazette Co.
v Town Bd., Town of Cobleskill, 111 Misc 2d 303, 304-305).
Additionally, the topics discussed during the executive session must
remain within the exceptions enumerated in the statute (see generally,
Matter of Plattsburgh Publ. Co., Div. of Ottaway Newspapers v City
of Plattsburgh, 185 AD2d §18), and these exceptions, in turn, 'must
be narrowly scrutinized, lest the article's clear mandate be thwarted by thinly veiled references to the areas delineated thereunder' (Weatherwax v Town of Stony Point, 97 AD2d 840, 841, quoting Daily Gazette Co. v Town Bd., Town of Cobleskill, supra, at 304; see, Matter of Orange County Publs., Div. of Ottaway Newspapers v County of Orange, 120 AD2d 596, lv dismissed 68 NY 2d 807).
"Applying these principles to the matter before us, it is apparent that
the Board's stated purpose for entering into executive session, to wit,
the discussion of a 'personnel issue', does not satisfy the requirements
of Public Officers Law § 105 (1) (f). The statute itself requires, with
respect to personnel matters, that the discussion involve the
'employment history of a particular person" (id. [emphasis supplied]).
Although this does not mandate that the individual in question be
identified by name, it does require that any motion to enter into
executive session describe with some detail the nature of the
proposed discussion (see, State Comm on Open Govt Adv Opn dated
Apr. 6, 1993), and we reject respondents' assertion that the Board's
reference to a 'personnel issue' is the functional equivalent of
identifying 'a particular person'" [Gordon v. Village of Monticello,
620 NY 2d 573, 575; 207 AD 2d 55 (1994)].
With respect to "negotiations", the only ground for entry into executive session that refers
to negotiations is §105(1)(e). That provision permits a public body to conduct an executive session to discuss "collective negotiations pursuant to article fourteen of the civil service law." Article 14 of the Civil Service Law is commonly known as the "Taylor Law", which pertains to the relationship between public employers and public employee unions. As such, §105(1)(e) permits a public body to hold executive sessions to discuss collective bargaining negotiations with a public employee union.
In terms of a motion to enter into an executive session held pursuant to §105(1)(e), it has
been held that:
"Concerning 'negotiations', Public Officers Law section 100[e]
permits a public body to enter into executive session to discuss
collective negotiations under Article 14 of the Civil Service Law. As
the term 'negotiations' can cover a multitude of areas, we believe that
the public body should make it clear that the negotiations to be discussed in executive session involve Article 14 of the Civil Service Law" [Doolittle, supra].
A proper motion might be: "I move to enter into executive session to discuss the collective
bargaining negotiations involving the teachers' union."
Next, you wrote that minutes are not made available in a timely manner. Section 106 of the Open Meetings Law provides direction concerning the contents of minutes and the time within which they must be prepared and disclosed. That provision states that:
"1. Minutes shall be taken at all open meetings of a public body which shall consist of a record or summary of all motions, proposals, resolutions and any other matter formally voted upon and the vote thereon.
2. Minutes shall be taken at executive sessions of any action that is taken by formal vote which shall consist of a record or summary of the final determination of such action, and the date and vote thereon; provided, however, that such summary need not include any matter which is not required to be made public by the freedom of information law as added by article six of this chapter.
3. Minutes of meetings of all public bodies shall be available to the public in accordance with the provisions of the freedom of information law within two weeks from the date of such meetings except that minutes taken pursuant to subdivision two hereof shall be available to the public within one week from the date of the executive session."
Based upon the foregoing, minutes must be prepared and made available within two weeks of meetings.
It is noted that there is nothing in the Open Meetings Law or any other statute of which I am aware that requires that minutes be approved. Nevertheless, as a matter of practice or policy, many public bodies approve minutes of their meetings. In the event that minutes have not been approved, to comply with the Open Meetings Law, it has consistently been advised that minutes be prepared and made available within two weeks, and that they may be marked "unapproved", "draft" or "non- final", for example. By so doing within the requisite time limitations, the public can generally know what transpired at a meeting; concurrently, the public is effectively notified that the minutes are subject to change.
Lastly, you indicated that meetings are held in rooms too small to accommodate those
interested in attending. Although the Open Meetings Law does not specify where meetings must be held, §103(a) of the Law states in part that "Every meeting of a public body shall be open to the general public..." Further, the intent of the Open Meetings Law is clearly stated in §100 as follows:
"It is essential to the maintenance of a democratic society that the public business be performed in an open and public manner and that the citizens of this state be fully aware of an able to observe the performance of public officials and attend and listen to the deliberations and decisions that go into the making of public policy. The people must be able to remain informed if they are to retain control over those who are their public servants. It is the only climate under which the commonweal will prosper and enable the governmental process to operate for the benefit of those who created it."
As such, the Open Meetings Law confers a right upon the public to attend meetings of public bodies and to observe the performance of public officials who serve on such bodies.
From my perspective, every provision of law, including the Open Meetings Law, should be implemented in a manner that gives reasonable effect to its intent. In my opinion, if it is known in advance of a meeting that a larger crowd is likely to attend than the usual meeting location will accommodate, and if a larger facility is available, it would be reasonable and consistent with the intent of the Law to hold the meeting in the larger facility. Conversely, assuming the same facts, I believe that it would be unreasonable to hold a meeting in a facility that would not accommodate those interested in attending.
The preceding paragraph appeared in an advisory opinion rendered in 1993 and was relied upon in Crain v. Reynolds (Supreme Court, New York County, NYLJ, August 12, 1998). In that decision, the Board of Trustees of the City University of New York conducted a meeting in a room that could not accommodate those interested in attending, even though other facilities were available that would have accommodated those persons. The court in Crain granted the petitioners' motion for an order precluding the Board of Trustees from implementing a resolution adopted at the meeting at issue until certain conditions were met. In my view, based on that decision and the provisions dealing with the enforcement of the Open Meetings Law (see §107), the actions of the Planning Board remain valid until a court renders a determination to the contrary.
It is also noted that §103(b) of the Open Meetings Law states that:
"Public bodies shall make or cause to be made all reasonable efforts to ensure that meetings are held in facilities that permit barrier-free physical access to the physically handicapped, as defined in subdivision five of section fifty or the public buildings law."
Based upon the foregoing, there is no obligation upon a public body to construct a new facility or to renovate an existing facility to permit barrier-free access to physically handicapped persons. However, I believe that the Law does impose a responsibility upon a public body to make "all reasonable efforts" to ensure that meetings are held in facilities that permit barrier-free access to physically handicapped persons. Therefore, if, for example, the Board has the capacity to hold its meetings in a room that is accessible to handicapped persons, I believe that the meetings should be held in the room that is most likely to accommodate the needs of those people.
I hope that I have been of assistance.
Robert J. Freeman
cc: Board of Education
Jerry Passer, President
R. Tim Marks, Superintendent