OML-AO-3831

July 12, 2004

The staff of the Committee on Open Government is authorized to issue advisory opinions. The ensuing staff advisory opinion is based solely upon the facts presented in your correspondence, unless otherwise indicated.

Dear

I have received your letters, as well as the materials attached to them. You have raised a variety of issues in relation to the creation of a position by the Penn Yan Central School District and its Board of Education. In consideration of those issues, I offer the following comments.

First, with respect to minutes of executive sessions, §106 of the Open Meetings Law pertains to minutes of meetings and states that:

"1. Minutes shall be taken at all open meetings of a public body which shall consist of a record or summary of all motions, proposals, resolutions and any other matter formally voted upon and the vote thereon.

2. Minutes shall be taken at executive sessions of any action that is taken by formal vote which shall consist of a record or summary of the final determination of such action, and the date and vote thereon; provided, however, that such summary need not include any matter which is not required to be made public by the freedom of information law as added by article six of this chapter.

3. Minutes of meetings of all public bodies shall be available to the public in accordance with the provisions of the freedom of information law within two weeks from the date of such meetings except that minutes taken pursuant to subdivision two hereof shall be available to the public within one week from the date of the executive session."

As a general rule, a public body may take action during a properly convened executive session [see Open Meetings Law, §105(1)]. In the case of most public bodies, if action is taken during an executive session, minutes reflective of the action, the date and the vote must be recorded in minutes pursuant to §106(2) of the Law. If no action is taken, there is no requirement that minutes of the executive session be prepared.

Various interpretations of the Education Law, §1708(3), however, indicate that, except in situations in which action during a closed session is permitted or required by statute, a school board cannot take action during an executive session [see United Teachers of Northport v. Northport Union Free School District, 50 AD 2d 897 (1975); Kursch et al. v. Board of Education, Union Free School District #1, Town of North Hempstead, Nassau County, 7 AD 2d 922 (1959); Sanna v. Lindenhurst, 107 Misc. 2d 267, modified 85 AD 2d 157, aff'd 58 NY 2d 626 (1982)]. Stated differently, based upon judicial interpretations of the Education Law, a school board generally cannot vote during an executive session, except in rare circumstances in which a statute permits or requires such a vote.

In my view, the issues considered by the Board as you described them would not have been among the few instances in which it could have taken action in executive session. Again, assuming that no action was taken in executive session, there would have been no obligation to prepare minutes.

In a related vein, I note that the Freedom of Information Law pertains to existing records and that §89(3) of that statute provides in part that an agency is not required to create a record in response to a request. Therefore, if, for example, there is no record containing an analysis of or rationale for a proposal or an action, there would be no obligation on the part of the District to prepare such a record on your behalf.

With respect to a delay in determining to grant or deny access to records, the Freedom of Information Law provides direction concerning the time and manner in which agencies must respond to requests for records. Specifically, §89(3) of the Freedom of Information Law states in part that:

"Each entity subject to the provisions of this article, within five business days of the receipt of a written request for a record reasonably described, shall make such record available to the person requesting it, deny such request in writing or furnish a written acknowledgement of the receipt of such request and a statement of the approximate date when such request will be granted or denied..."

If neither a response to a request nor an acknowledgement of the receipt of a request is given within five business days, or if an agency delays responding for an unreasonable time after it acknowledges that a request has been received, a request may, in my opinion, be considered to have been constructively denied. In such a circumstance, I believe that the denial may be appealed in accordance with §89(4)(a) of the Freedom of Information Law. That provision states in relevant part that:

"...any person denied access to a record may within thirty days appeal in writing such denial to the head, chief executive, or governing body, who shall within ten business days of the receipt of such appeal fully explain in writing to the person requesting the record the reasons for further denial, or provide access to the record sought."

In addition, it has been held that when an appeal is made but a determination is not rendered within ten business days of the receipt of the appeal as required under §89(4)(a) of the Freedom of Information Law, the appellant has exhausted his or her administrative remedies and may initiate a challenge to a constructive denial of access under Article 78 of the Civil Practice Rules [Floyd v. McGuire, 87 AD 2d 388, appeal dismissed 57 NY 2d 774 (1982)].

Second, while I agree with your contention that there would be no basis for discussing the creation of a position during an executive session, the materials suggest that that issue may have been intertwined with another, which is characterized in a memorandum prepared by a Board member as the "deficiencies in [the] performance" of a principal. In this regard, as you are likely aware, the Open Meetings Law is based upon a presumption of openness. Stated differently, meetings of public bodies must be conducted open to the public, unless there is a basis for entry into executive session. Moreover, the Law requires that a procedure be accomplished, during an open meeting, before a public body may enter into an executive session. Specifically, §105(1) states in relevant part that:

"Upon a majority vote of its total membership, taken in an open meeting pursuant to a motion identifying the general area or areas of the subject or subjects to be considered, a public body may conduct an executive session for the below enumerated purposes only..."

As such, a motion to conduct an executive session must include reference to the subject or subjects to be discussed, and the motion must be carried by majority vote of a public body's total membership before such a session may validly be held. The ensuing provisions of §105(1) specify and limit the subjects that may appropriately be considered during an executive session.

The language of the so-called "personnel" exception, §105(1)(f) of the Open Meetings Law, is limited and precise, for it states that a public body may enter into an executive session to discuss:

"...the medical, financial, credit or employment history of a particular person or corporation, or matters leading to the appointment, employment, promotion, demotion, discipline, suspension, dismissal or removal of a particular person or corporation..." (emphasis added).

Due to the presence of the term "particular" in §105(1)(f), I believe that a discussion of "personnel" may be considered in an executive session only when the subject involves a particular person or persons, and only when at least one of the topics listed in §105(1)(f) is considered.

When a discussion concerns matters of policy, such as the manner in which public money will be expended or allocated, the functions of a department, the creation or elimination of positions, or matters relating to the budget, I do not believe that §105(1)(f) could be asserted, even though the discussion may relate to "personnel". For example, if a discussion of possible layoffs relates to positions and whether those positions should be retained or abolished, the discussion would involve the means by which public monies would be allocated. In short, in order to enter into an executive session pursuant to §105(1)(f), I believe that the discussion must focus on a particular person (or persons) in relation to a topic listed in that provision. As stated judicially, "it would seem that under the statute matters related to personnel generally or to personnel policy should be discussed in public for such matters do not deal with any particular person" (Doolittle v. Board of Education, Supreme Court, Chemung County, October 20, 1981). On the other hand, insofar as a discussion involves the performance of a particular person, as in the case of consideration of the deficiencies of a particular employee, I believe that an executive session may properly be held. In the situation you described, the issue would have involved the employment history of a particular person or perhaps a matter leading to the discipline or removal of a particular person. In short, it appears that the matter of creating a position may have been overlapped or been intertwined with the performance of the principal. Insofar as consideration of creating a position may have been separate from the performance of the principal, I do not believe that there would have been a basis for entry to executive session. However, insofar as the two issues could not be segregated or discussed separately, I believe that §105(1)(f) would have validly served as a means of entering into executive session.

Next, an element of your correspondence involves a request for records that apparently may be withheld under §87(2)(g) of the Freedom of Information Law. That provision pertains to internal governmental communications, and those portions of such communications consisting of opinions, advice, recommendations and the like need not be disclosed. As I understand one of the memoranda attached to your correspondence, it has been contended that opinions expressed in writing or during executive sessions "must be kept confidential in order to comply with Section 805-a of the General Municipal Law." That statute states in subdivision (1)(b) that "no municipal officer or employee shall...disclose confidential information acquired by him in the course of his official duties or use such information to further his personal interests." From my perspective, the term "confidential" has a narrow and precise technical meaning. For records or information to be validly characterized as confidential, I believe that such a claim must be based upon a statute that specifically confers or requires confidentiality. Stated differently, an act of Congress of the State Legislature must forbid disclosure in order to characterize information as confidential.

While a variety of subjects may properly be discussed during executive sessions and numerous records or portions thereof may validly be withheld under the Freedom of Information Law, the ability to exclude the public from a meeting or withhold records does not necessarily represent or signify a requirement of confidentiality. I note that both the Open Meetings Law and the Freedom of Information Law are permissive. Under §105 of the former, a public body may enter into executive session to discuss one or more of the subjects appearing in paragraphs (a) through (h) of subdivision (1); there is no requirement that those subjects be discussed in executive session. Moreover, as you are aware, in order to conduct an executive session, a motion to do so must be made and carried by a majority vote of the total membership of a public body. If such a motion does not carry, even though a public body might have the authority to discuss an issue in executive session, it would not have the obligation to do so. Similarly, under the Freedom of Information Law, §87(2) provides that an agency may withhold records in accordance with the grounds for denial of access that follow. The State's highest court has found that an agency may choose to disclose records even though it has the ability to deny access [see Capital Newspapers v. Burns, 67 NY 2d 562 (1986)].

In short, as a general rule, even though discussions by a public body may in appropriate circumstances be conducted in private and certain records may justifiably be withheld, the matters considered might not be "confidential", but rather beyond the scope of public rights of access. In a case in which the issue was whether discussions occurring during an executive session held by a school board could be considered "privileged", it was held that "there is no statutory provision that describes the matter dealt with at such a session as confidential or which in any way restricts the participants from disclosing what took place" (Runyon v. Board of Education, West Hempstead Union Free School District No. 27, Supreme Court, Nassau County, January 29, 1987). While §805-a of the General Municipal Law may be useful for providing guidance, for the reasons described above, I do not believe that the use of the term "confidential" is entirely clear.

I am unaware of any statute that would prohibit a Board member from disclosing the kind of information to which you referred, even though information might have been obtained during an executive session properly held or from records marked "confidential" or that need not be disclosed.

If a discussion by a board of education concerns a record pertaining to a particular student (i.e., in the case of consideration of disciplinary action, an educational program, an award, etc.), the discussion would have to occur in private and the record would have to be withheld insofar as public discussion or disclosure would identify the student. As you may be aware, the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (20 USC §1232g) generally prohibits an educational agency from disclosing education records or information derived from those records that are identifiable to a student, unless the parents of the student consent to disclosure. In the context of the Open Meetings Law, a discussion concerning a student would constitute a matter made confidential by federal law and would be exempted from the coverage of that statute [see Open Meetings Law, §108(3)]. In the context of the Freedom of Information Law, an education record would be specifically exempted from disclosure by statute in accordance with §87(2)(a). In both contexts, I believe that a board of education, its members and school district employees would be prohibited from disclosing, because a statute requires confidentiality. Again, however, no statute of which I am aware would confer or require confidentiality with respect to the matters described in your correspondence.

While there may be no prohibition against disclosure of the information acquired during executive sessions or records that could be withheld, the foregoing is not intended to suggest such disclosures would be uniformly appropriate or ethical. Obviously, the purpose of an executive session is to enable members of public bodies to deliberate, to speak freely and to develop strategies in situations in which some degree of secrecy is permitted. Similarly, the grounds for withholding records under the Freedom of Information Law relate in most instances to the ability to prevent some sort of harm. In both cases, inappropriate disclosures could work against the interests of a public body as a whole and the public generally. Further, a unilateral disclosure by a member of a public body might serve to defeat or circumvent the principles under which those bodies are intended to operate.

Historically, I believe that public bodies were created to order to reach collective determinations, determinations that better reflect various points of view within a community than a single decision maker could reach alone. Members of boards should not in my opinion be unanimous in every instance; on the contrary, they should represent disparate points of view which, when conveyed as part of a deliberative process, lead to fair and representative decision making. Nevertheless, notwithstanding distinctions in points of view, the decision or consensus by the majority of a public body should in my opinion be recognized and honored by those members who may dissent. Disclosure made contrary to or in the absence of consent by the majority could result in unwarranted invasions of personal privacy, impairment of collective bargaining negotiations or even interference with criminal or other investigations. In those kinds of situations, even though there may be no statute that prohibits disclosure, release of information could be damaging to individuals and the functioning of government.

I hope that I have been of assistance.

Sincerely,

Robert J. Freeman
Executive Director

RJF:tt

cc: Board of Education
Gene Spanneut