December 5, 1995
Ms. Martha Bennett
Bronxville League of Women Voters
101 Boulder Trail
Bronxville, NY 10708
The staff of the Committee on Open Government is authorized to issue advisory opinions. The ensuing staff advisory opinion is based solely upon the information presented in your correspondence.
Dear Ms. Bennett:
I have received your letter of November 7 in which you requested an advisory opinion concerning the practices of the Eastchester Board of Fire Commissioners in relation to the Open Meetings Law. According to your letter, the Board consists of five members, with one elected each year for a term of five years.
Based on the information that you provided, I offer the following comments.
First, the Open Meetings Law pertains to meetings of public bodies, and §102(2) of the Law defines the phrase "public body" to mean:
"...any entity, for which a quorum is required in order to conduct public business and which consists of two or more members, performing a governmental function for the state or for an agency or department thereof, or for a public corporation as defined in section sixty-six of the general construction law, or committee or subcommittee or other similar body of such public body."
Section 174(6) of the Town Law states in part that "A fire district is a political subdivision of the state and a district corporation within the meaning of section three of the general corporation law". Since a district corporation is also a public corporation [see General Construction Law, §66(1)], a board of commissioners of a fire district in my view is clearly a public body subject to the Open Meetings Law.
Second, it is emphasized that the definition of "meeting" [see Open Meetings Law §102(1)] has been broadly interpreted by the courts. In a landmark decision rendered in 1978, the Court of Appeals, the state's highest court, found that any gathering of a quorum of a public body for the purpose of conducting public business is a "meeting" that must be convened open to the public, whether or not there is an intent to take action and regardless of the manner in which a gathering may be characterized [see Orange County Publications v. Council of the City of Newburgh, 60 AD 2d 409, aff'd 45 NY 2d 947 (1978)].
I point out that the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals was precipitated by contentions made by public bodies that so-called "work sessions" and similar gatherings held for the purpose of discussion, but without an intent to take action, fell outside the scope of the Open Meetings Law. In discussing the issue, the Appellate Division, whose determination was unanimously affirmed by the Court of Appeals, stated that:
"We believe that the Legislature intended to include more than the mere formal act of voting or the formal execution of an official document. Every step of the decision-making process, including the decision itself, is a necessary preliminary to formal action. Formal acts have always been matters of public record and the public has always been made aware of how its officials have voted on an issue. There would be no need for this law if this was all the Legislature intended. Obviously, every thought, as well as every affirmative act of a public official as it relates to and is within the scope of one's official duties is a matter of public concern. It is the entire decision-making process that the Legislature intended to affect by the enactment of this statute" (60 AD 2d 409, 415).
The court also dealt with the characterization of meetings as "informal," stating that:
"The word 'formal' is defined merely as 'following or according with established form, custom, or rule' (Webster's Third New Int. Dictionary). We believe that it was inserted to safeguard the rights of members of a public body to engage in ordinary social transactions, but not to permit the use of this safeguard as a vehicle by which it precludes the application of the law to gatherings which have as their true purpose the discussion of the business of a public body" (id.).
Based upon the direction given by the courts, if a majority of the Board gathers to discuss public business, in their capacities as Board members, any such gathering, in my opinion, would constitute a "meeting" subject to the Open Meetings Law.
Third, I point out that every meeting must be convened as an open meeting, and that §102(3) of the Open Meetings Law defines the phrase "executive session" to mean a portion of an open meeting during which the public may be excluded. As such, it is clear that an executive session is not separate and distinct from an open meeting, but rather that it is a part of an open meeting. Moreover, the Open Meetings Law requires that a procedure be accomplished, during an open meeting, before a public body may enter into an executive session. Specifically, §105(1) states in relevant part that:
"Upon a majority vote of its total membership, taken in an open meeting pursuant to a motion identifying the general area or areas of the subject or subjects to be considered, a public body may conduct an executive session for the below enumerated purposes only..."
As such, a motion to conduct an executive session must include reference to the subject or subjects to be discussed, and the motion must be carried by majority vote of a public body's membership before such a session may validly be held. The ensuing provisions of §105(1) specify and limit the subjects that may appropriately be considered during an executive session. Therefore, a public body may not conduct an executive session to discuss the subject of its choice.
Since you referred to discussions involving the budget and labor negotiations, two of the grounds for entry into executive session are pertinent.
Although it is used frequently, the word "personnel" appears nowhere in the Open Meetings Law. While one of the grounds for entry into executive session often relates to budgetary or personnel matters, the language of that provision is precise. In its original form, §105(1)(f) of the Open Meetings Law permitted a public body to enter into an executive session to discuss:
"...the medical, financial, credit or employment history of any person or corporation, or matters leading to the appointment, employment, promotion, demotion, discipline, suspension, dismissal or removal of any person or corporation..."
Under the language quoted above, public bodies often convened executive sessions to discuss matters that dealt with "personnel" generally, tangentially, or in relation to policy concerns. However, the Committee consistently advised that the provision was intended largely to protect privacy and not to shield matters of policy under the guise of privacy.
To attempt to clarify the Law, the Committee recommended a series of amendments to the Open Meetings Law, several of which became effective on October 1, 1979. The recommendation made by the Committee regarding §105(1)(f) was enacted and now states that a public body may enter into an executive session to discuss:
"...the medical, financial, credit or employment history of a particular person or corporation, or matters leading to the appointment, employment, promotion, demotion, discipline, suspension, dismissal or removal of a particular person or corporation..." (emphasis added).
Due to the insertion of the term "particular" in §105(1)(f), I believe that a discussion of "personnel" may be considered in an executive session only when the subject involves a particular person or persons, and only when one or more of the topics listed in §105(1)(f) are considered.
When a discussion concerns matters of policy, such as the manner in which public money will be expended or allocated, I do not believe that §105(1)(f) could be asserted, even though the discussion relates to "personnel". For example, if a discussion involves staff reductions or layoffs which can be accomplished by according to seniority, the issue in my view would involve matters of policy. Similarly, if a discussion of possible layoffs relates to positions and whether those positions should be retained or abolished, the discussion would involve the means by which public monies would be allocated. On the other hand, insofar as a discussion focuses upon a "particular person" in conjunction with that person's performance, i.e., how well or poorly he or she has performed his or her duties, an executive session could in my view be appropriately held. As stated judicially, "it would seem that under the statute matters related to personnel generally or to personnel policy should be discussed in public for such matters do not deal with any particular person" (Doolittle v. Board of Education, Supreme Court, Chemung County, October 20, 1981).
Relevant with respect to labor negotiations is §105(1)(e), which authorizes public bodies to conduct executive sessions regarding "collective negotiations pursuant to article fourteen of the civil service law." Article 14 of the Civil Service Law, commonly known as the "Taylor Law", deals with the relationship between public employers and public employee unions. Consequently, a public body may discuss or engage in collective bargaining negotiations during an executive session. In the situation that you described in which one member of the Board engaged in negotiations, the Open Meetings Law would not have applied. In short, one member acting as the Board's representative in negotiations would not have constituted a "meeting" of a public body.
Lastly, since you referred to "a little final report" issued following negotiations, I direct your attention to the Freedom of Information Law, which pertains to access to government records. As a general matter, that statute is based upon a presumption of access. Stated differently, all records of an agency are available, except to the extent that records or portions thereof fall within one or more grounds for denial appearing in §87(2)(a) through (i) of the Law.
In my view, a contract, such as a collective bargaining agreement, would be available under the Freedom of Information Law in its entirety, for none of the grounds for denial would be applicable. Similarly, books of account, ledgers, and other records reflective of the receipt and disbursement of public monies would generally be available. I note that records might justifiably be withheld during the course of negotiations pursuant to §87(2)(c). That provision permits an agency to deny access to records insofar as disclosure would "impair present or imminent contract awards or collective bargaining negotiations."
In an effort to enhance compliance with and understanding of the statutes considered in the preceding commentary, a copy of this response will be sent to the Board of Fire Commissioners.
I hope that I have been of assistance.
Robert J. Freeman
cc: Board of Fire Commissioners